361 Khan; likewise, the Russian conquest of Turkestan proper began with the capture of Tashkent. Consequently Tashkent has a more mixed population than any other town in Turkestan; until recent times it has been almost entirely composed of Sarts, the mixed race par excellence.

361/175 Of the earlier history of Tashkent little is known. The date of its origin is unknown, although it certainly goes back far into antiquity. /141/ At the time of the campaigns of Alexander the Great, the region of Tashkent was still populated by the Indo-European Scythians, ancestors of the present Slavs /sic/ for at that time the Syr-Darya formed the boundary between the Persian Kingdom and the land of the Scythians. If Tashkent already existed then, as is almost certain on the basis of local relationships, it was in any case the seat of that Scythian king whose subjects Alexander fought on the right bank of the Syr-Darya, and who sent a legation to Alexander after the battle near Khodzhent /Leninabad/ to Alexandria Eskate, founded by Alexander. (1)

1. Cf. my monograph: Alexanders des Grossen Feldzuge in Turkestan /The Campaigns of Alexander the Great in Turkestan/ Munich, 1893.

Tashkent is first mentioned by a Chinese traveler Hsüan Tsang, who went through it in the Seventh century A. D. on his pilgrimage to India. From the second half of this century on it belonged to the realms established by the Arabs in Central Asia. Later it came under the rule of the Seljuks, who ruled Bukhara from 1004 on, as well as under a series of various other Turkic peoples who constantly were coming from Dzungaria. About the year 1220, Tashkent was taken by Chinggis Khan and remained thereafter under his rule and that of his successors until Tamerlane incorporated it into ~~his~~ great empire. Later it came into the possession of the famous Uzbek Prince Shaibani Khan, who took Bukhara from the last successors of Tamerlane. In 1598 Tashkent was captured by the Kazakhs, whose power reached its height at that time, and it remained in their power until 1723. In that year the Kazakhs were overpowered by the Dzungarians under the command of Galdan Tseren, and pushed back to the west, whereupon Tashkent remained for a time a part of the land of Dzungaria. When this empire was destroyed by the Chinese in 1757, who shortly thereafter slew almost all the Dzungarians, over a million people, Tashkent remained independent for a time, and set up a sort of confederation with the towns of Turkestan and Chimkent, but was forced from time to time to recognize the supremacy of the emir of Bukhara. 361/ In 1814, Tashkent was captured by the Khan of Kokand and remained 175 in his possession until the Russian conquest. Only transitorily did it pass again into the possession of the emir of Bukhara Nasr Allah, when he conquered Kokand in 1840 and executed the current ruler, Khan Mohammed Ali. The association between Kokand and Tashkent was always loose, however, and the Tashkent people revolted at every favorable and unfavorable /142/ opportunity. Tashkent was usually ruled by a beg appointed by the khan, but was also temporarily the residence of the khan and as such was the capital of the Kokand Khanate.

Tashkent was taken by storm by the Russians in 1865. This is not the place for a detailed history of the Russian conquest of Turkestan; I will only explain the general course of events and the circumstances surrounding them, which led the Russians, actually against their will, to advance into Central Asia and to the subjugation of these distant lands.

The advance of the Russians into Turkestan, which ultimately led them in a relatively short time to the borders of India, was brought about by the Kazakhs. As mentioned above, the Kazakhs of the Middle Horde, having already seized the towns of Auliye-Ata /Dzhambul/, Turkestan and Chimkent, in 1598 captured Tashkent as well and made it their chief stronghold. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, they were so hard pressed by the Dzungarians, that they felt impelled to turn to Russia for aid. Since this help could not be granted by Russia because of her position at that time, the Kazakhs were defeated by the Dzungarians and forced westward, away from the Tashkent region. As a result of this involuntary westward advance of the Middle Horde, the Little Horde/the westernmost Kazakhs/ was cramped in its nomadic grounds. For this reason, in 1732, the Little Horde sought to become subjects of Russia, and this was granted in the following year. Two years later, the Middle Horde also submitted voluntarily to Russian rule. In 1801, part of the Little Horde migrated, with permission of the Russian authorities, into the region vacated by the Kalmycks between the Ural and the Volga Rivers and from that time these Kazakhs have been known as the Inner Horde or Bukey Horde. In 1847 the Great Horde finally submitted to the Russians as well. Eight years later, part of the Kirgiz followed the example of the Kazakhs, when those nomadizing in the Tyan Shan /Tien Shan/ mountains, likewise submitted to the Russians.

The submission of the Kazakhs to Russian rule, however, was in

175 fact only nominal. The Kazakhs understood their relation to the 361 Russians to be one in which the latter were obliged to protect the Kazakhs against enemy attack, while the Kazakhs for their part recognised no obligation to the Russians and with the greatest impartiality plundered the Russian caravans and settlers as much as their neighbors on the Turkestan side. The Russian administrators tried everything possible to establish some order among the Kazakhs and to stop the attacks of banditry /143/ on the Russian settlements and caravans. At first, they sought to achieve this by installing khans who were completely loyal to them. Since these men, however, precisely because they were installed by the Russians, enjoyed no influence with and no attention from the Kazakhs, the irritation increased and almost complete anarchy reigned. The post of honor of khan was, for this reason, entirely abolished in 1833, and the Kazakhs were divided into a number of Volosts /small administrative unit/ and auls /nomadic village/ with elders elected by them, who were subordinate to the Russian district head. This measure, which subsequently proved very useful because thereby the power of the sultan and the previous hereditary tribal heads was permanently broken, created a violent ferment among the Kazakhs, which was used by the eminent Sultan Kasym and his son Kenesary to call for a general uprising of the Kazakhs in 1838 against the Russian rule which was not completely suppressed until 1844.

For all that, the establishment of peace and order in the Kazakh steppe was still unsuccessful, because the Kazakhs were continually incited by their neighbors in Turkestan, the peoples of Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva against Russia, and because the Kazakh bandits, after perpetrating an act, could always flee without difficulty to the Central Asian khanates, since the borders along the territories of China, Kokan Bukhara and Khiva were not in Russian hands.

The Russian regime, therefore, had recourse to other means, which finally achieved the end in view, but which entangled the Russians in a new and much more serious action and one of much greater consequence, with the Central Asian khanates. These means consisted in gradually surrounding the whole Kazakh steppe on the Turkestan side with an unbroken line of defences, on the one hand, to make it more difficult for the Kazakhs to slip over the border after an attack on the Russians, and on the other hand to secure themselves against attacks from the Khiva and Kokand. These defences were pushe forward simultaneously from two sides, out from Orenburg /Chkalov/

which had been founded in 1735, and from Siberia, gradually nearing the Syr-Darya on one side, and the Tyan Shan on the other. After the Russians reached the Syr-Darya, near the Aral Sea, they advanced eastward along the river, while a series of fortresses were built from the east along the northern piedmont of the Alexander range /Kirgizskiy khrebet/ until these two fortifications met at Chimkent. From Orenburg, the forts of Emba and Ak-Bulak were established in 1839, Orenburgsk and Uralsk in 1845, Raim or Aralsk in 1847, and Koss-Aralsk and Kara-Butak in 1848. From Siberia /144/ the forts of Kopal, Vernoye /Alma Ata/ and Kastek were established in 1847. Sergiopol /Ayaguz/ was already founded in 1831.

Until this time the establishment of fortified works proceeded without particular difficulties, being within Russian territory. Upon the continuation east from the Aral Sea, and west from Vernoye /Alma Ata/, there was frequent fighting with Kokand, since further fortresses all had to be built on Kokand territory, for their establishment in the desert was naturally impossible.

The battle was opened from the west by General Perovsky, who took the first Kokand fort on the Syr-Darya, Ak-Mechet', by storm in 1853, despite a brave defence by the Kokand commander, Yakub Beg. Yakub Beg was destined for still greater things, for he later rose to be independent ruler of Kashgar, and as such inspired the respect of Russians and Englishmen alike. On the site of the destroyed Ak-Mechet' a Russian fortification, Fort Perovsk, /Kzyl-Orda/ was established, and in addition the forts of Kazalinsk and Karmakchi, /Dzhusaly/ were built in the same year. In 1861 Fort Dzhulek was added to these. From Vernoye /Alma Ata/ out, where a Russian town was founded in 1854, the Kokand fortresses of Tokmak and Pishpek /Frunze/ were conquered in 1860, and that of Merke in 1862. /From middle page 144 to middle page 149 of the original text has not been translated--Translator/

The capture of Tashkent was, to be sure, against the express will of the Russian regime and Chernlaev was subsequently removed from his position for disobedience. Nevertheless it was impossible to give the town back to Kokand, for the pro-Russian party in Tashkent, which had essentially facilitated the taking of the town, was too compromised, and would have been abandoned without defense to the revenge of its fanatical enemies, and because then Russia would have lost the confidence of the natives of Turkestan for all time. For this

175 361 reason in 1866, Tashkent was joined to the regions conquered previously into a single province /Government/ called the Syr Darya province, which was assigned to the general province of Orenburg. Since, however, no governor could get along with the General Governor Kryzhanovski, in 1867, the Syr-Darya province was again separated from Orenburg and combined with the Semirechiye province into a separate General Government which retained the name Turkestan. General Adjutant Konstantin Petrovich von Kauffmann was named first General Governor of Turkestan with his capital in Tashkent, and he later added the region of Samarkand (1868), the districts of Amu Darya (1873), Fergana (1876) and temporarily also the region of Kuldja (1871 to 1881) to the Turkestan General Government.

2. The Meaning and Origin of the Name "Tashkent."

103 361 Concerning the origin of the name of the town of Tashkent, etymologists have often wracked their brains without reaching a satisfactory conclusion. /150/ The word Taskent means "city of stone," and is a combination of two words from different languages: the Turkish 'tash' (stone) and the Iranian 'kent' (city). Now Tashkent is built not of stone but of clay throughout, and in the surrounding region there is no stone to speak of because the ground on which the town is built is an extensive and thick stratum of loess. One can therefore explain Tashkent according to the theory of 'lucus a non lucendo, as a city in which there is no stone. Many have therefore interpreted the name as indicating a city with the diameter of a 'tash,' since a tash is used by the natives as a unit of measurement, in this case, eight kilometers. I think, however, that the origin of the name Tashkent can be explained much more naturally. The Chinese monk Hsüan Tsang, who passed Tashkent on his pilgrimage to India (629-645 A. D.), calls the town in his travel account Chashkent in Chinese orthography; among the later Arabic writers it appears under the name Shashkent, (1) and

1. Sultan Baber already knows Tashkent by the name Tashkend; he notes expressly, however, that this appeared in the works of earlier writers as Shash or Djadj.

this is oviously the original Indo-European name of the town; for

000 undergone pressures of an unusual intensity, designed to force them into a mould quite other than the pattern which they formerly knew. And since an operation of assimilation is easier when the graft is cut off from the original stock, it has suited the new rulers to exploit old tendencies and impose a system of isolation even more rigorous than that which existed in ancient times.

● 175 The curtain had fallen on Turkistan long before the days
177 of Soviet rule, even before the Tsars. The fanatical exclusive-
114 ness of the Bukhara Emirs made of that city, and even more of its neighbour Samarkand, a legend remote from ordinary life. A few Russian agents were able to visit Khiva or Bukhara in the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries, but many were caught and enslaved; indeed the enslavement of Russians by the Khiva Khans was a prime cause of the wars against that State. European names other than Russian are few. The best-known are the intrepid Alexander Burnes,[1] who reached Bukhara by way of Merv in 1832 and was favourably received, Abbott of North-West Frontier fame who visited Khiva in 1840, those two unfortunates Stoddart and Conolly,[1] who reached Bukhara in 1841 only to die a horrible death at the hands of the Emir Nasrullah, and lastly Dr. Wolff,[1] who at great risk to himself penetrated to the same city, two years later, to clear up the fate of the Englishmen who had preceded him. The Hungarian Vambéry,[1] scholar enough to pass as a dervish, found in 1863 a country cut off from contact with other Muslim lands to the south, living in an atmosphere of isolation and suspicion which nearly cost him his life. The seclusion of Samarkand was even more striking. According to the American, Schuyler,[1] from the time of González de Clavijo,[2] who was there in 1404 on an embassy to Timur from Henry III of Castile, until the journey of Khanikov in 1841, Samarkand remained unvisited by Europeans except by a single Russian envoy in 1620 and a chance Russian non-commissioned

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[1] For these and future references see Bibliography at the end of this book. Burnes, I, 15; Conolly, I, 25; Wolff, I, 100; Vambéry, I, 94; Schuyler, I, 84 (i, 240 and 360). References outside Bibliography are to Togan's book, which is in Turkish.

[2] Bib. I, 22.

officer in 1774 — two visits in over four hundred years. No 177 wonder that it had a halo of romance and piqued the curiosity 175 ← of the Western world. 114

It was therefore not surprising that the Russian capture of Tashkent in 1865, of Samarkand three years later, and of Khiva in 1873, should have caused a stir. Now at last, it was thought, the mysteries of these magic cities would be unveiled. But no, it was only the privileged, and those carefully shepherded, who were allowed to pass the barriers. Among 114 these Schuyler and Curzon were pre-eminent. There were indeed a number of French correspondents to whom the Franco-Russian accord of the time provided opportunities for what Curzon dismissed as a luxuriant crop of descriptive literature of little note, and one, the Vicomte de Vogüé, who was recognized even by Curzon as more distinguished, but whose articles, 'though characterized by an agreeable fancy and by all the picturesqueness of the Gallic idiom, added little to our previous stock of knowledge on the subject'.[1] Curzon's own book[1] has not so much colour as Schuyler's; he did not travel so widely in the countryside nor had he equal opportunity to meet and talk with the people. But it is a fitting companion volume both to Schuyler and to his own great classic on Persia, and it contains passages where the balance of his style and the sweep of his exposition aspires to the heights of his obvious exemplar, Gibbon.

But Schuyler and Curzon were little more than flashes in 177 the darkness. Although the study of the Central Asian peoples was most diligently pursued by Russian scholars under the Tsars — the names of Radloff and Barthold are of wide-world renown — little was done up to the time of World War I to facilitate European or American travel and research north of the Oxus. There seemed always something to conceal, a rebellion, a massacre, an advance not to be at once avowed. The Tsar's government consistently looked with jealousy and irritation upon the intrusion of others into its Asiatic territories, and kept a strict hand on all the controls. The new

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[1] Bib. I, 27 (p. 8).

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133 it is at present. After the Arab conquest, the Amu Darya changed its course to carry all its water as at present into the Aral Sea, where previously only one arm had debouched. The Ōzboy Channel dried up, and the waters that had once filled Sarikamish were diverted into the Aral. But in 1221, when the Mongols captured Urgench, then capital of Khorezm, the Amu Darya had reverted to its old course, and once more flowed to the Caspian by the Ōzboy as its main branch, thus opening up a very important channel of trade from east to west. The Sir Darya (Jaxartes), or more probably a large arm of it, flowed through the now dried up Yeni Darya, which began above Ak Mechit (Kizil Orda) and, moving to the south-west past the Aral Sea, debouched into the Amu Darya to swell its waters on their way through the Ōzboy to the Caspian. Muslim authority is quoted to establish that it was only in exceptional years of flood that the combined Oxus and Jaxartes — a sort of 'Shatt-al-Turk' — reached the Caspian, flowing through the Balkhan gap to the gulf by what is now Krasnovodsk. The river usually sank into the Karakum at a point known to Arab geographers as Kalat-us-sin (in Mongol times Rebat Tamgach) near the present Kurtish and over 100 miles east of the Balkhan hills. At this point there is a fault in the desert, with a declivity a few feet high, over which the combined river flowed whenever its volume sufficed to take it on to reach the Caspian.

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● 175 This continued until 1573, when the Amu Darya and the Sir Darya settled into their present courses to the Aral Sea, and trade on the Ōzboy and Yeni Darya came to an end. The alteration in the course of the rivers Togan counts as the great catastrophe of the XVIth century affecting Turkistan.

He continues:

> Before 1573 goods could be shipped direct by boat from Azerbaijan and from the Volga by the Ōzboy to the waterfalls near Rebat Tamgach, and trans-shipped thence to Urgench. As long as the route by Urgench on the Ōzboy and Yeni Darya remained open, the towns on the rivers Talash, Chu and Ili grew immensely

2[alternate changes in river beds -- See pp 23-24 ct.116 -- Ana

in importance. Chinese authorities of the VIIth–IXth centuries, 133
and Arab geographers of the Xth century, give us the names of 176
many towns and settlements in the Talash and Chu country. The scholar Jemal-ul-Karshi tells us the names of many scholars of his own time who lived in the towns on the lower Sir Darya, and reports on their service to science. Among the MSS. in the libraries of Istanbul there are many religious and literary works of this Mongol period — unfortunately not so far examined. If the Amu 125
Darya were to flow once more into the Caspian, and the lower parts 133
of the Chu, which now sink into the sands, could be made useful for sowing, then in some future Turkistan there might be a revival of the lower Sir Darya, the Özboy, the lower Talash and Chu, and Urgench, Akmechit and Tokmak become once more administrative and cultural centres.

At first sight it is not apparent how a diversion in the lower course of the Amu Darya could affect the prosperity of the upper piedmontane tracts watered by the Ili, Chu and Talash rivers. But separate passages [1] indicate that the writer is seeing a vision of some kind of triple canal project as worked out in the Panjab. He has in view the weaving together of a network of rivers and link canals, leading the Chu and Lake Balkhash through the Betpak Dala to reinforce the Sir Darya, the Sir Darya into the Amu Darya, and the combined rivers into the Caspian Sea.

It is clear from Schuyler [2] that the early Russian engineers were of the same mind. According to him, the theory was based originally on surveys made by an early Tsarist officer, Colonel Tchaikovsky. Schuyler makes two observations, first that the Özboy is in line with the Yeni Darya, and secondly that there is indubitable evidence to the level of Issik Köl having once been several hundred feet higher than it was when he visited the country. It could then have acted as a reservoir at the source of the Chu River. This evidence was held to support a proposition that the volume of water in the Chu might have been so increased as to discharge into the Sir Darya, and thence in line into the Yeni Darya, so forcing the Amu into the Özboy bed and towards the Caspian

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[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 21 and 580 *et seqq.*

[2] *Op. cit.* i, 50 *et seqq.*

185 Sea. The subsequent depression of Issik Kōl greatly reduced
123 the volume of the Chu, with the result that the rapid current in the Sir Darya, no longer turned by a river coming from the east, impinged upon the opposite bank, creating swamps and finally struggling through them along the level steppe until it emptied as at present into the northern end of the Aral Sea. In the same way the Amu Darya, forming marshes about the places where it formerly turned into the Özboy, found a new outlet at the southern end of the Aral Sea.

Togan's idea is that, by another change to be engineered by man, the economic future of his Türkili could be assured. We shall see that Soviet engineers have put forward a great engineering project for diverting the Amu Darya to the Caspian to irrigate the Karakum, and the natural deduction from this would be that they believe water did once reach the Turkmen desert from the river. But the latest Soviet theory seems to be that the Oxus has not changed its course since the Tertiary Period, when it was turned to the Aral by an earth movement along the axis of the Caucasus uplift.[1] In this view, which is at variance with many records, Soviet savants are unlikely to be relying on what others have said. It is more credible, I think, that they are upheld by the dogma that it is left to Soviet man alone to change the face of nature. The Tertiary Period is safe enough; but historical convulsions are a different matter. They cannot be admitted to have occurred if they in any way detract from the inevitable movement of a Five-Year Plan. When it comes to history, it must be Soviet man who is the first to put things straight.

● 175 There were, however, reasons for the decline of Turkistan from its position held in the Middle Ages other than changes in the course of the rivers. Although these reasons are historical, they are of a general nature, and since they are connected with the use by man of geographical sea-routes in preference to land-routes as the medium of commerce, it is

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[1] Bib. II, 1, Professor J. Bernal.

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convenient to refer to them at this point.

In the XIIIth century the Mongol Chingiz Khan conquered China, Turkistan and Persia. The Empire of Chingiz was divided between his four sons: here it will suffice to say that the Ilkhan dynasty which established itself in Persia and Irak on the ruins of the Caliphate and the Seljuks was founded by Hulagu, who belonged to the same branch of Chingiz' family as Kublai the Great Khan of China, both being sons of Chingiz' fourth son Tului.

It was therefore in the interests of Kublai to conclude, if possible, with his brother Hulagu an arrangement for the transport of goods between the Tului family dominions in the east and in the west, and this in fact is what was done as soon as Kublai Khan was able to seize the ports in southern China. Trade entered the Persian Gulf. This led to the enrichment of Hormuz as the port on the Gulf, and to the rise of the great and prosperous city at Herat. For a time Herat became the principal clearing centre for the trade of Central and Western Asia and a distinguished culture flourished there under the later Timurid princes. The countries to the north of the Oxus, allotted without any very clear definition to the elder branches of Chingiz' family (the Golden Horde and the Chaghatai Horde), were left in the cold. This process had been accelerated by the utter destruction of Khorezm itself at the hands of Juchi, Chingiz' eldest son. The products of the Far East now came up to the Oxus by way of Baluchistan and Hormuz. The Far Eastern traffic had thus been diverted from the caravan to the sea, and in so far as caravan routes in Turkistan were needed to serve it these ran from north to south, and not through the mountain passes. But still some trade with Europe and the West remained.

With the rounding of the Cape by the Portuguese at the end of the XVth century, and the formation of British, Dutch and French companies a century later, the trade by caravan through Turkistan to Europe also died. Except for local commerce, even the Persian Gulf became a backwater, and Herat lost its pre-eminence. The economic axis had swung

175 from a latitudinal to a longitudinal direction. The maritime age had succeeded that of the caravan, and Turkistan was no longer a centre of power or commerce. In a seaman's age its place had been taken by Western Europe.

Once the through routes were empty of traffic, the only remaining attraction keeping Turkistan within a southern orbit was the gravitational pull of a common Islamic tradition. Even this began to weaken as communications broke down. Religious and cultural bonds began to snap, and local religions to spring up. Shiah votaries will dispute Togan's conclusion, given as an instance of this tendency, that the spectacular rise of the Shiahs of Persia in Safavid times from being mainly a mountain sect to the position of a State religion was due to this cause. Small principalities began to arise in Turkistan. The process was hastened by the internecine wars between the two Turkish houses, the Ottomans in Istanbul and the Safavids in Isfahan — also Turks from Erdebil in Azerbaijan. The Turkish world was disintegrating, and the way was open for European pressure from the south and Russian pressure from the north.

000 Some of these ideas are curiously like the theme developed in one of the essays of Arnold Toynbee.[1] He too sees the world in terms of a caravan age succeeded by a maritime age, and to him also Farghana in the caravan age appears as a central point of the world. Can it be, Toynbee asks, that in an air age it may once more become so? This, he judges, may come about for the reason that in an air age a world centre of gravity is likely to be determined not by physical but by human geography, and to be situated at a point equidistant from two main poles of world population. If so, it will not be because Farghana is a void. Like Kashmir and Peshawar farther south, it is itself a jewel of fertility, ringed round by the world's greatest mountains and deserts. It is remarkable that one of the greatest of contemporary historians has seen the same light, spreading from the past and casting a beam into the future.

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[1] Bib. I, 93.

175 The central points in the earlier history of Turkistan are two. The first is the Mongol deluge which, under Chingiz Khan, swept over the land in the years 1219–24; the second the thunderbolt launched by Timur nearly two centuries later (1379–1405). Timur, though of Mongol antecedents, used Chaghatai Turkish as his mother tongue and belonged to what Barthold[1] called *la tribu mongole turquisée* of the Barlas, established at the ancient twin city of Kesh[2] where the Kashka Darya issues from the mountains.

000 It will be found that the human material, and the forces applied to it, will fall into a more comprehensible order if viewed in periods divided by these two outstanding events in the history of Central Asia. But, before embarking on any analysis of these periods, there are a number of general distinctions and definitions that I must make, if there is to be any understanding of the people mixed together in the crucible which is Central Asia.

197 A reference to the map at the end of this book will show the reader the disposition of the peoples of Russian Central Asia, arranged as it stands today in accordance with the various languages, Turkic and Iranian, spoken by the agglomerations known loosely as Uzbeks, Kazaks, Karakalpaks, Kirghiz, Turkmens (all Turkish) and the Tajiks (Iranians). It will be seen that in more than one case the speakers of these languages overlap across the international frontiers into China, Afghanistan and Persia. [191] There are also areas within the country in which Uzbek mingles with Tajik, Turkmen or Karakalpak, Kirghiz with Uzbek, and so on. Bilingualism in Uzbek and Tajik is common in areas of overlap, especially so in the towns [194] from Khojent to Bukhara. Turkic Uzbek in the towns has lost its vowel harmony under Iranian influence, but has preserved it in the north of the Uzbek linguistic territory, where there was no such influence. On the other hand, the juxta-

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[1] *Op. cit.* p. 168.

[2] The modern name of these cities is Shahr-i-Sabz and Kitab. They are separated from Samarkand by the Takhta Karacha pass over a spur of the Hissar mountains.

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174 This conclusion of course requires qualification in the case of
the relatively few sedentary and town populations speaking
only a Turkic language: in that case language is not a safe
criterion, for these 'Turks' may be, and often are, turkized
Tajiks. History shows many instances of other peoples adopting
Turkish ways, but until recently very few of the adoption
[191] by Turks of the dress of other civilizations.[1] Many more of the
[101] town-dwellers are bilingual in Uzbek and Tajik; in their case
this bilingualism points even more strongly to the Tajik or
mixed origin of the individuals concerned. It was to sedentary
dwellers of this kind, whether bilingual or speaking only
Tajik, that the true Turks formerly applied the pejorative
appellation of 'Sart'.

197 At the same time, the Iranization of the Turkic tongues in the
191 southern cities is an illustration of the mingling of the raindrops
of which I have spoken.[1] Lastly, the bilingualism of the oasis-
strip from Khojent to Bukhara identifies specific points at which
the Turkish flood passed on to leave Iranian islands unswamped
by the inundations from the steppe and the mountains.

000 Behind all the parade of ethnology and linguistics it is well
to look always for the essential difference between the settled
cultivators and townsmen of the scattered oases of Transoxiana
and the nomads of the northern and the western steppe (now
the Kazak and Turkmen country). That is the indispensable
fact, without which no insight can be obtained into the tangle
of events passing for history in Central Asia. It is the old
antithesis of Cain and Abel, so clear to eastern thought, a
distinction always before the local leaders, on whose minds it
was indelibly impressed by the events of the Basmachi struggle
177 of 1918–24. We shall see in the subsequent analysis of periods
● 175 that the settled population, whatever its ethnic origin, was for
771 centuries exposed to Persian influence and immigration from
the south, and was indeed for the first three hundred years
after the Muslim conquest actually controlled by Persian rulers.
One result of this contact was an indoctrination with the

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[1] A notable exception is the Indianization of the Turks who followed Babur to India, due partly to the conscious policy of his grandson Akbar, but mainly to the small infusion of Turkish blood into India's vast body.

[1] [for metaphor, see cat. 116, pp 31-- Analyst]

orthodox tenets of the most rigid form of Hanafi Sunniism — 177
for the Samanids and others who controlled this country from 175
the south were orthodox, and long centuries had yet to elapse 771
before the rulers of Persia took to Shiism as the Persian State religion under the influence of Shah Ismail, founder of the Safavid dynasty of Persia in the XVIth century. A sedentary oasis population is peculiarly prone to the excesses of a morose clericalism, such as flourished in Transoxiana at least as long as the early part of the present century. On the other hand, the nomads of the steppe — the successors of the Mongol *ulus* or hordes, themselves not Islamized for the best part of a century after Chingiz Khan — naturally sit lightly to established orthodoxy or indeed to congregational worship of any kind. It is easy to simplify and the margins are blurred, but it is true in the broad to say that one of the essential differences of Persian and Turk is visible in the attitude of each to religion — an excessive formalism susceptible to the fanatical appeal, set against an easy nonchalance which may indeed recognize the immanence of God, but sees him more clearly upon the mountain than within the mosque.

But the nomad's influence on events in Central Asia, and beyond Central Asia, is not attributable only to his attitude to the things of the spirit. It is in fact he who (until the Russian coming) supplied the driving force which altered the course of history right across Asia and into Europe. As the analysis proceeds through the list of dynasties who from time to time held sway over the settled regions, we shall observe, without finding it easy to explain, the sudden emergence at more or less regular intervals of hosts which march out of the sunrise on the steppe, ruthless and disciplined, and in a few years sweep away the carefully gathered fruits of the sedentary peoples. Who are these nomads? What is the meaning of this outer nomadism? And what have they left behind in the way of flotsam and jetsam after the day of their glory has passed? And, lastly, how far have the nomadic and the settled peoples become intermingled in the course of the movements of the centuries?

200 After the Turks came flooding in the Mongols. Much ink has been spilt by the learned in discussing the relationship between Mongol and Turk in Central Asian history. Confusion reigns in the use of such terms as Mongol, Tatar, Turk, Sart, Kazak and Uzbek, and there is a tendency to complicate the discussion still further by an approach through linguistics. For instance, Chuvash, a Turkic language spoken on the Volga, has a distinct admixture of Bulgar terms, and it is sometimes sought therefore to distinguish its speakers as the true representatives of the Golden Horde, who mingled with the Bulgars — an earlier-than-Mongol stock — upon the Volga. 175 But even if the armies of Chingiz were themselves pure Mongols (and there is reason to believe they were not), the ultimate truth is that at that date this was a Turkish sea into which the Mongol rivers flowed. The Mongol civilization was absorbed by the Turkish civilization in Transoxiana, just as it was absorbed by the higher culture of China and Russia. [197] The name of Chaghatai, the second son of the Mongol Chingiz, even became that of the literary Turkic language of the Eastern Turks, and, less than two centuries later, Timur himself, belonging to a tribe of Mongol origin, had become in all essentials a Turk. Perhaps the best way of setting this question in its true light is again to point to the last great Timurid, the Emperor Babur. Himself described on his father's side as descended in the fifth generation from Timur, and on his mother's side in the thirteenth generation from Chaghatai the second son of Chingiz — and so of Mongol ancestry on both sides — he writes in Turkish, and in his Memoirs [1] speaks with disdain of the Mughul (Mongol) race: 'Of all others', he says, 'the wretches of Mughuls were most active in unhorsing and stripping the stragglers'. And later in verse: [2]

Were the Mughuls angels, they would be bad,
Written in gold, evil would be the name Mughul.

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[1] Bib. I, 61, p. 150.

[2] The verse may be an interpolation by Babur's son, the Emperor Humayun. But the argument stands.

It is ironical that Babur's line should have come to be 175 known in India as the Mughul dynasty ! The truth, of course, is summed up in Barthold's phrase *Mongol turquisé*. The real lasting antithesis, owing little to ethnological differences between Turk and Mongol, is that which existed between the sedentary population of the oases and the nomads of the steppe.[1]

With Babur as guide I conclude that in this region the ethnic distinction of Turk and Mongol has had no ultimate meaning ; for, even if much of the impulse for the migrations came from Mongolia, the movements set on foot were significantly Turkish. Who, then, were these Turkish tribes of the steppe who created a force which at least four times in history — under the Seljuks, under Chingiz, under Timur, and under the Ottomans, carried the banners of Central Asia into the heart of other continents ?

Much interesting detail is forthcoming[2] as to the identity 174 of the various Turkish tribes and their relationship with one 101 another ; but for the general reader this would obscure the canvas. The ramifications are endless and confused. But two names may be taken as typical of the whole — the Oghuz, the tribal ancestors of the warriors who carved out two empires, the Seljuk and the Ottoman, and the Kipchak who succeeded to the Oghuz in the northern steppe. The Oghuz are thus the fathers of the Western Turks and of the Turkmens, their remnant east of the Caspian ; while the Kipchak are one of the main tribal components of the 'Kazak', true Uzbek and Nogai clans. The name Kipchak is to be found ranging across the steppe north of the Sir Darya from the Irtish to the Urals and beyond, and as far south as the Vale of Farghana. Barthold suggests that the migrations of the Oghuz may have been prompted by Kipchak pressure, itself set in motion by the Mongol threat from farther east. I take then the name Kipchak as a type of the shifting Turkish organizations which occupied

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[1] Those desirous of pursuing this line of thought will find interesting material in Elias and Ross, Bib. I, 31. See also Bib. I, 13, pp. 37 and 67.

[2] Cf. Togan, *op. cit.* chap. ii, from p. 23 onwards for over sixty pages.

IV

CRUCIBLE OF EMPIRES

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> *We are dead but our living was great: we are dumb, but*
> *a song of our State*
> *Will roam in the desert and wait with its burden of long,*
> *long ago. . . .*
>
> Flecker

•175

I HAVE remarked that the history of the Eastern Turks after the Arab conquest falls into clearer relief if it is grouped round the two violent upheavals caused by the invasion of the Mongols under Chingiz Khan early in the XIIIth century and the conquests of Timur issuing from his base at Kesh, near Samarkand, at the end of the XIVth century. The periods before the Russian pressure began early in the XVIIIth century then become:

(i) The pre-Mongol era, 700–1200.
(ii) Chingiz Khan and his successors, 1200–1350.
(iii) Timur and the Timurids, 1350–1500.
(iv) The Uzbek conquest under the Shaibanids, with the period of growing disorder and dissolution into the three petty States of Khiva (Khorezm), Bukhara and Kokand, 1500–1750.

(i) *Pre-Mongol Era*

Transoxiana as far as the Saihun (Sir Darya) was conquered by the Arabs during the reign of the *Umayyid* Caliph Abdul Malik in the last decade of the VIIth century. The conquest was the natural extension to the north of the overrunning of Sassanian Persia and was achieved by the Emir Kotaiba ibn Muslim with armies of which Arabs formed the spearhead only, reinforced by many thousands of troops from almost every part of Persia.

Not more than fifty years later grave disaffection broke out among the virile peoples of this north-eastern part of the Arab dominion, stirred by an oppressive Umayyid policy which refused to accord equal rights even to Muslim converts who were not Arabs. The estrangement of Khorasan and Transoxiana was adroitly used by the *Abbasids* of Baghdad, who with aid from Persia succeeded round about 750 in supplanting the Damascus house of the Umayyids. It was during the Abbasid period that a second centre of urban civilization was firmly planted in Transoxiana under Muslim auspices. Abbasid rule was largely in the hands of Khorasanis, so that Persian influences, as representing the new faith, became dominant in the oasis-cities along and between the Jaihun and the Saihun. What had taken place in fact under the impact of the faith was a Persian invasion and consolidation of the settled Turkish lands in the Turanian basin. Indeed Barthold holds that Persian population and influence in and over this region predated Islam and were evident under the Sassanian dynasty, during which Turkish tribes near the rim of the bowl had adopted Zoroastrianism.[1]

When towards the end of the IXth century the *Samanids* (874–999) succeeded to the Abbasid heritage in the frontier provinces of Khorasan and Transoxiana, the result was to clamp down the Persian yoke and influence even more tightly on the homelands of the Turks. Until the Turkish tribes adopted Islam they were in no position to aspire to rule, and up to this time Islam had had no success with them. There was indeed a period of about 300 years (last decade of VIIth to last decade of Xth century) between the Muslim conquest of Transoxiana and the first certain testimony to the adoption of Islam by Turks of any marked political influence. Up to that time Arab writers consistently number the Turkish tribes as enemies of the faith.

The Samanids came from Balkh and enforced a rigorous

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[1] *Op. cit.* p. 33.

● 175 form of Hanafi Sunniism,[1] perhaps stimulated by the struggle which Islam had had to conduct with Buddhism for the mastery of that region. In the Hindu Kush, not far south of the rim, the great idols of Bamian, hewn in the rock, still stand to attest the strength which Buddhism once had on the southern fringe of Turan, and it has been suggested that the prevalence of theological schools (*medreses*) in Bukhara and other Turkish cities is to be explained as a relic of Buddhist [103] influence. The Sanskrit word *vihara* means a monastery, and the name Bukhara is probably derived from it.

The first Turkish house to embrace Islam was that of the *Karakhanids*, in the somewhat legendary person of Bughra Khan of Kashghar (d. *circa* A.D. 960). They are known to some historians as the *Ilak Khans*. The domains of this house extended to the north over Yedi Su, and its capital came later to be at a place named Balasagun, now unknown but probably on the Chu River. Bughra Khan's grandson, Harun, succeeded in the year 999 in taking Bukhara and Samarkand from the Samanids, thus supplanting an Iranian by a Turkish power for the first time for at least three centuries. Flushed with success the Karakhanids tried to carry their conquests farther south but were defeated by Mahmud of Ghazni,[2] with the result that the Amu became the dividing-line between the Karakhanid and the Ghaznavid realms. Early in the XIth century and not long after the establishment of Turkish rule in Transoxiana by the Karakhanids began the famous thrust of the *Ghuzz* or *Oghuz* Turks from the regions north of the Saihun (Sir Darya).

It was this great agglomeration of Turkish tribes, divided into twenty-four clans, which was destined to produce three of the most famous peoples in Islamic history. The first of

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[1] The *Hanafi* is regarded as the school of the Sunnat, as opposed to the Shiah, in the most orthodox descent. There are three other Sunni schools, the Hanbali, the Shafii and Maliki. The Hanafi doctrine was that professed by the Ottomans, by the Turks of Transoxiana and by the great majority of Indian and Afghan Muslims.

[2] The first Ghaznavid with his seat at Ghazni between Kabul and Kandahar, the patron of the Persian poet Firdausi and the curse of India in the XIth century.

these was the *Khalij* or *Khalji*,[1] the forerunners of the great Ghilzai tribe of eastern Afghanistan who gave a dynasty to Delhi and, centuries later, having adopted the Afghan language and custom, crushed the Safavid dynasty of Persia and disputed with the Durranis the mastery of Afghanistan. The second was the *Seljuks* (1038–1150), who pressed down into Khorasan from across the Oxus with armies whose discipline astonished the Muslim world, becoming converted to Sunni Islam as they did so. Having conquered Persia, they entered Baghdad to release the degenerate Abbasid caliphs from tutelage to Turkish mercenary bodyguards, and went on into Syria and Armenia. In 1071, Alp Arslan, their chief, defeated the Byzantines at Melasgird and for a few years their rulers controlled an Empire which was bounded by the Oxus and the Persian Gulf to north and south and by the Indus and the Mediterranean to east and west. The *Turkmens* of the lower Oxus and Turkmen steppe are their descendants. Great Seljuk rulers were Tugrul Bey, Alp Arslan and Malik Shah. They succeeded to the Samanid heritage of strictly orthodox Hanafi Sunniism, and persecuted not only Shiahs but the devotees of all other Sunni schools. Like other hordes which poured off the steppes of Central Asia, the Seljuk Empire could not survive the death of one or two great war-leaders and started to break up by A.D. 1100. It left as its most important segment in the west the Konia sultanate in Anatolia, and in the east the hereditary governorate of Khorezm (Khiva) under a line which came to be known as the Shahs of Khorezm. The Mongol invasion of the XIIIth century gave both of these their death-blow, the Anatolian kingdom yielding place to a third offshoot of the Oghuz tribal confederacy.

In Anatolia these were the *Ottomans*. A small border Khan Othman, acting as Khan of a fief of Turkdom on the Byzantine frontier, in 1326 obtained control of Bursa and founded the Ottoman Empire. His exploits and those of his

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[1] For a very clear exposition of the identification of the Khalij with the Ghilzai see Fraser-Tytler, Bib. I, 36. His argument is strengthened by the fact that in the Pashtu language these tribes are not called *Ghilzai*, a Persianized form, but *Ghalji* or *Khalji*.

•175 immediate successors fall in a period more than a century after the Mongol invasions of Turkistan and are not directly related to the pattern of events in Central Asia. But it is necessary to mention them in order to indicate the stages in the spread of Turkish influence. More important for our purposes is the fact that, however far the Anatolian Turks (including in this context Osmanlis and Turks of the Caucasus)[1] may have diverged from those of Transcaspia, in the Turkmens, also descendants of the Oghuz, may be found a connecting link between Eastern and Western Turk.

There remains yet another ruling house which held sway in parts of Transoxiana before the Mongol deluge. This is the *Kara Kitai* (*circa* 1137–1200). On their passage through Transoxiana the Seljuks had given but passing attention to affairs nearer home, bent on conquest far afield. But the tumult of their going had weakened the Karakhanids of Samarkand, exposing them to attack from powerful forces from the east. These new arrivals were the Kitai, who, issuing from North China (where their dynasty had been known as the Leao), established themselves in Mongolia and, passing on thence by the usual Ili Valley route, succeeded early in the XIIth century in defeating the Karakhanids (with whom they are not to be confused), and established themselves both in Transoxiana and in Kashghar. The Kara Kitai were Chinese in appearance, tradition and culture, and they never embraced Islam. Their chief claim to remembrance is that, although their dominion lasted less than a century, they gave a name to China, which many Muslims and all Russians to this day know as Kitai.

After Chingiz Khan the Kitai disappear from history, and the survival of their memorial in the name they gave to China is therefore the more extraordinary. It can only be explained by saying that, being the only conquering people reaching as far as Maveraunnahr out of China proper, they deeply impressed their Turkish subjects with the Chinese culture of which they were representative. So, when thinking of China, the thoughts of an Eastern Turk would turn to the Kitai.

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[1] The Azerbaijanis are the most important Caucasian Turks. Having been subjected for many years to the Safavid dynasty of Persia, they, along with their brethren in what is still Persian Azerbaijan, have been induced, alone among Turks, officially to embrace Shiism.

Making their capital at Balasagun, the forgotten site in the Chu region, they defeated the Karakhanids at Khojent in 1137, and even at one time carried their arms successfully against Sanjar, the last great Sultan of the Seljuks, who by that time had attained to a vague overlordship over the Karakhanid chiefs. The Kitai prince took the title of Gurkhan, and at the height of their power this dynasty controlled the country as far as Khorezm. Their administration was Chinese in fashion, and they permitted the local chiefs, including the Karakhanids, a limited authority subject to payment of tribute. The district of Khorezm became a border battleground between the Muslim Seljuk rulers, who maintained there an important governorship, and the 'infidel' Kitai. It was the importance of Khorezm as the Muslim outpost that led to this appointment becoming hereditary in the line of the Seljuk governors known as the Shahs of Khorezm, who in the years immediately preceding the Mongol deluge maintained a fruitless and inconclusive struggle against the Kitai masters of the upper rivers.

Some of the Kitai professed Christianity in the Nestorian tradition. Many scholars have identified them with the legends of Prester John, but in the event it is the name of this dynasty, and not its faith, which constitutes its right to remembrance. The poetry of our own tongue still knows the name Cathay.

The *Shahs of Khorezm* (1097–1220) by the beginning of the XIIIth century had attained a considerable magnificence. As the Russians found later, the oasis of Khiva on the lower Oxus (which was once Khorezm) is ringed round on all sides by deserts and sea, the passage of which is rendered harder by the winter blizzards and the intolerable summer heats. We have seen[1] that at about this time (1220) there is some reason to think that the Amu may have reverted to its old course to the Caspian; and a branch of the Sir may have reached across towards the Khorezm capital Urgench, making of the 'hushed

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[1] [See cat. 11C p.23-24 -- Analyst]

175 Chorasmian waste' a fertile network of canals. Entrenched in this fertility, and protected by the sands, had arisen an intellectual and Islamic life of a high order. Here was laid the foundation of that Eastern Turkic literature in a language which later took the Mongol name of Chaghatai. The Khorezm eastern frontier reached across the Kizilkum as far as the town of Otrar on the Sir Darya, and it was near here in the town of Yese that the mystic Ahmed was born and flourished (d. 1167).[1] Muhammad, the last Shah of Khorezm, became wealthy and powerful, and succeeded in obtaining a somewhat uncertain control over Bukhara and Samarkand, having defeated the Kitai on the Talash in 1210. This victory encouraged the Shah to a show of self-esteem; he posed as Caliph and Protector of the Faith, arrogating to himself the name and titles of the last Seljuk and even of Alexander the Great. When, a few years later, the challenge came from Chingiz Khan, he fancied himself strong enough not only to defy it but to take the initiative against the Mongols. But his kingdom was like that of the Chaldees.

(ii) *Chingiz*[1] *and the Mongols*

Chingiz Khan rose to power in Mongolia in the year 1205 after defeating his rival Jamuga, who had tried to unite the popular party against him. According to Soviet historians,[2] Chingiz, like others after him, decided on war to distract attention from civil strife between contending Mongol factions at home. His first assault was directed on Turkish tribes, the Kirghiz of the Yenisei, the Merkit and the Naiman, whom by 1269 he had subdued. The remnants fled westward, the Merkit towards the Kipchak country, the Kirghiz to the Tienshan and the Alai, where they now are, and the Naiman farther south into the kingdom of the Kitai, then, as we have seen, engaged in a struggle with the Shah of Khorezm for predominance in Maveraunnahr. Chingiz then turned his

↗ [cat. 116, pp. 272 -- Analyst]

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[1] For spelling see Appendix, final paragraph.

[2] The official theory is crystallized in a Soviet novel which won the Stalin prize, *Jenghiz Khan*, by V. Yan. Bib. I, 106.

[1] [For the importance of Ahmed Yesevi, see cat. 116, pp. 45-46--Analy

arms eastward, overran China and in 1215 took Peking. While he was doing this he left his eldest son, Juchi, in command on the western frontier, and it was when Juchi was in pursuit of the fleeing Merkit on the Kipchak steppe that his troops first clashed with the borderguards of the Khorezm Shah. At this time Muhammad, the last Shah, had reached the peak of his arrogance and, seeing himself as the champion of Islam and encouraged by his victory over the Kitai, he dreamed of the conquest of China, and held the intervening Mongols in contempt. Embassies of merchants passed between Chingiz and Muhammad; finally, with a total disregard of good faith or the consequences, a caravan sent by Chingiz was treacherously slaughtered by Muhammad's order at the frontier town of Otrar (close to the modern Aris) in 1218.

This brought the Mongol down on Khorezm in the following year. Leaving a column under his son Juchi to storm Otrar, he himself took Bukhara and Samarkand and other of the oasis-cities, sacked and burned them, and slaughtered the populations. The Shah Muhammad fled to a Caspian island, where he died; his son Jalaluddin, after putting up a gallant fight, was forced to flee by way of Ghazni into India, and after a last desperate battle barely escaped his pursuers by swimming the Indus into safety. Meanwhile Chingiz had carried his arms far and wide to the Caucasus, the Don, and Kiev, slaughtering and burning all the way. Juchi meanwhile had sacked all the cities of Khorezm. In 1225 the tale of destruction was complete and Chingiz returned to Mongolia to die two years later at the age of 65.[1] He was predeceased by a few months by his eldest son Juchi, the father of the Golden Horde.

The dominions of the great Mongol descended to the branches of his four sons, Juchi, Chaghatai, Ogodai and Tului. Each area was known as the *ulus* or tribe, and, as is natural with a nomadic organization, the allotment was tribal rather than territorial. For this reason the limits of each are difficult to trace and there was much merging at the margins. But the general pattern is clear enough[1] if only because the allotment from west to east happened in this case to follow the order of seniority of the conqueror's sons. Thus Juchi's patrimony, which owing to his death descended direct from Chingiz to Juchi's sons Orda and Batu, was dominion over all the country farthest to the west, from the Sir Darya over the Urals to the valleys of the Volga and Don. This was the Golden Horde. 175

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[1] Some historians give Chingiz' age at death as 72. I follow Howorth, Bib. I, 44

The domain of Chaghatai embraced most of Turkistan, that is to say, Maveraunnahr, Farghana and Yedisu, but it included also what is now Sinkiang and, to the south, a large part of Khorasan. It thus comprised most of the settled populations of the agricultural districts, and all the most flourishing cities of Central Asia, Bukhara, Samarkand, Tashkent, Khojent, Kashghar, Herat and Ghazni. Chaghatai's *ordu* or capital was at Almalik, a lost encampment in the valley of the Ili, probably near the site of the present Kulja but placed by some at the modern Alma Ata.

Ogodai, the third son, succeeded to the country of the original Mongols, where he established his *ordu* at Karakoram, near the present Ulan Bator, and held at first the supreme authority, or Khakanate, of the Mongol Empire. The limits between the dominions of Chaghatai and Ogodai were ill-defined as all boundaries between nomadic hordes must be, but the subsequent struggle for power indicates a shifting frontier somewhere in the Jungarian region on the Ili. As the house of Ogodai declined, most of this region was merged with the territories of the Chaghatai Khans.

The descendants of Tului, the fourth and youngest son, inherited the Far-East conquests of Chingiz in China, with capital at Peking. It was not long before the Khakanate was usurped by this branch, which developed into the famous Yüan dynasty of China.

Chaghatai and Ogodai both died in 1241, depriving two of the four *ulus* of leadership and setting the brood at one

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[1] See Genealogical Table with this chapter. [cat. 116, p.54-- [illegible]]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

● 175 another's throats. Although Ogodai's son Kuyuk maintained a precarious position as Khakan for a few years, and his nephew Kaidu was later to come near to retrieving the position, in the end the chief power fell in 1251 into the hands of Mangu, the eldest son of Tului, from him descending to his brother Kublai — Marco Polo's Great Khan and Emperor of China — in 1257. Tului had three famous sons, Mangu, Kublai and Hulagu, and it was the third of these, the notorious Hulagu, who was sent by Mangu to the south-west. He it was who captured and sacked Baghdad in 1258, finally destroying the shadow of the Abbasid Caliphate and setting up the Il Khan dynasty of Persia to dispute with Chaghatai's descendants the dominion of Turkistan. In the meantime Mangu, succeeded by Kublai, had established himself in the supreme Khakanate, with its base now in China and not on the Mongol steppe. We have seen, how communication between the eastern and western branches of the Tului *ulus* was opened by sea to the detriment of the Chaghatai *ulus* which, after a number of vicissitudes, at this period had contrived to retain the major control over Transoxiana and the caravan routes.

The position reached in Turkistan at the close of the XIIIth century must be viewed in two aspects, that of the *ulus* of the steppe, and that of the *ulus* of the settled country. On the steppe the descendants of Juchi and Batu, the Golden Horde, were still in control of all the country right into the heart of Russia. In 1236–40 Batu had extended his grandfather's conquests even farther: passing over a prostrate Russia he pillaged Poland, Hungary and Bohemia, and the terror of his banners was spread as far as the gates of Udine near Venice. Owing to their distance from the Mongol homelands, the Golden Horde, at the western limits of the Empire, were able to develop their own policies untouched by the struggles of the other branches of the Mongol house. Since they controlled only a small part of the settled area — Khorezm for a while was subject to their Khans — and severed, as they were, by the interposing steppe from the troubles of High Asia, they were free to cope with the Russian princes and to

1 [see col 116, p 27 -- Ar. 36,5t]

establish a power in the west as far as the Crimea.[1] They 175 became indeed the ancestors of the Turco-Tatar tribes of the Eurasian steppe on both sides of the Caspian and in the Urals. Although the Mongol element no doubt transfused and enriched the original Turkish stock, it was gradually absorbed in it, until the name Tatar as distinct from Turk remains one of the few reminders of the mingled heritage. This process was aided and accelerated by the gradual adoption of Islam as the faith of these peoples. Berke (1257–66) was the first prince of the Golden Horde to embrace Islam, but a century had elapsed from Chingiz' death before Islam became universally acknowledged by the Mongol hordes. Shaiban, Batu's and Berke's brother, and Uzbek, a descendant of this branch, appear in the genealogies as the eponymous ancestors of the Shaibanids and the Uzbek tribes, thus further demonstrating what Barthold calls the *turquisation* of the descendants of Chingiz. It was indeed the Golden Horde which, after Timur's Empire had failed, was destined to supply the Uzbek chieftains who restored Turkish power in Transoxiana.

In the settled areas of the two rivers the position was not so simple.

It is hard to devastate the steppe, nor was it the Mongol way, for they needed flocks and herds for the subsistence of their terrible armies. With the oases it was otherwise. The sack of cities and mass slaughter of the inhabitants is one aspect and the better known. But there is another. The flocks were let loose on the rich irrigated lands as pasturage, after a tradition not yet entirely dead, that of the outspoken contempt of the herdsman for the cultivator. Clavijo, ambassador from the Spanish Court to Timur in 1404, has left a vivid description of this nomadic spirit, each band following its own fancy, pasturing its herds where crops were finest, so that Timur in his time had to intervene to protect the sedentary population.

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[1] In 1475, shortly after their capture of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottomans occupied the Crimea. Thus the two horns of the advancing Turks, western and eastern, had joined.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RLL

175 The factional struggles between the rival *ulus* led to the sacking of cities not only once but again and again. Thus Khorezm passed from the Golden Horde to the Chaghatai Horde, and back again. Urgench and Otrar were subject to constant pillage and the canals decayed. The irruption of Hulagu into Khorasan led to internecine strife between the Ilkhans (his dynasty) and the Chaghatai, with one result that Bukhara, destroyed by Chingiz in 1220 and rebuilt, was again razed to the foundations in 1272 and lay for ten years a ruin. Other cities suffered a like fate, the situation in Turkistan being rendered more confused owing to the uncertain power of the Chaghatai and Ogodai domains squeezed between the stronger forces on the flanks, that of the Golden Horde in the north-west and that of the sons of Tului exercised both from China in the north-east and from Persia under Hulagu's descendants in the south. Commerce too suffered terribly, one insane Mongol method of warfare being for each prince to murder the traders from his rival's domain who happened to be within his power. Thus in 1262 Hulagu decreed the slaughter of every merchant from Berke's territory, and Berke retaliated by executing Hulagu's merchants.

Yet all the time behind the carnage a slow process of *turquisation*, accompanied or perhaps caused by the conversion to Islam, was being worked out in the naturally wealthy areas which formed the heart of the Chaghatai domain. There were Muslim Governors commanding Mongol respect such as Mahmud Yalavash and his son Masud Beg who were able in the cities of the plains to ensure for themselves a position which confounded their savage masters, and to preserve the essence of an Islamic civilization, already in Transoxiana six centuries old.

The first Muslim Khan of the Chaghatai was Borak, and he and his successor Dava are in the direct Chaghatai line, from which was descended Kutluk Nigar, the mother of Babur. After Dava's death the situation became more and more confused, the nominal power passing rapidly down a line of shadow-princes, of whom the last of any note was Kazan

(d. 1347). The real power fell into the hands of Turkish 175 governors, wielding authority in the Chaghatai name. The distinction between princes and vezirs was marked by title, the Chaghatai prince being known as *Khan*, and the vezir as *Beg*. Like Timur himself, and Babur after him, there is no doubt that many of these *Begs* were of an ancestry inextricably mixed, but by Timur's time, in Western Turkistan at least, their *turquisation* had become complete. Thus they began to take the name of Chaghatai to distinguish themselves and their country from Jungaria and Eastern Turkistan, which came to be known to Babur and others as Mughulistan. There is of course what may be called a Tamerlane legend, written up by a group of chroniclers at the direct orders of Timur himself, and sycophancy has obscured the facts by glorifying the ancestry of Timur and identifying him with the Mongol princes who had gone before. In practice, what had happened was that there remained a pride in Mongol antecedents as shown by the retention of the name Chaghatai itself, but that by the end of the XIVth century the atmosphere had become definitely both Muslim and Turkish.

The Mongol dominion in its prime achieved a staggering immensity. Indeed Chingiz and his four sons, in an age of horse transport, had established across Asia and Europe the vastest continental empire ever known until it was rivalled by the empire of the Russias and their satellites seven centuries later. Like Russia, the Mongol power stretched from China to the Black Sea; the Mongol threat, like Russia today, overhung both Western Europe and the Indian peninsula. To us, and viewed in the perspective of time, the Mongols 000 seem to have come and gone in a fleeting moment, so that historians are accustomed to speak of their rule as a passing phenomenon. But in their passing they threw on the screen a shadow premonitory of a dominion which was to be as extensive in bounds and as lacking in mercy as their own. So too the new Eurasian empire, as dependent as that of the Mongols on the life of one man and on singleness of aim within a small and jealous palace circle, may prove to be as ephemeral as theirs.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

(iii) *Timur and the Timurids*

175 Timur, born in 1335, usurped the Chaghatai power in Transoxiana in 1369. He belonged to the Barlas tribe of turcized Mongols, resident at Kesh on the Kashka Darya south of Samarkand. The fact that he came from an irrigated and settled part of the country is significant: while he maintained the tradition of close relations with the nomads who, with their horses and arms, provided the sinews of war, he was attracted by the garden pleasances and the flavour of the already hoary civilization whose cities were grouped along the mountain-skirts where the fertilizing waters spring. In the matter of martial tradition, Timur may have felt himself closer to the men of the steppe than to the people of the towns and villages, but, as Barthold says, he had recourse to a procedure gravely suspect in Chaghatai and Mongol eyes, for he chose a great city to serve as his dwelling-place, and he began to
346 construct in it great buildings. Nor was it only in Samarkand
-175 that Timur is remembered for the splendid architecture that bears his name. At Yese too he built a magnificent shrine over the grave of the mystic Ahmed, and at Shahr-i-Sabz, his native place, there still stand the immense piers of the Ak Serai, the white palace of his dreams. Though after the manner of his kind Timur carried fire and terror across all Western Asia, his memorials attest not only a passion to build grandiosely, as have many conquerors before and after him, but something more intimate. He had a feeling for the setting of a shrine — at Yese in the plain beneath the Kara Tav not far from the flowing Sir Darya, at Samarkand the jewels in a green garden against a mountain background. Man of violence himself, his grandsons, and their grandsons, had that peculiar touch and feeling after beautiful things, the work of nature, the product of man's artistry, that we associate with the Muslim spirit at its best. Most famous is the Registan in Samarkand with its three *medreses*, the oldest built by Timur's grandson Ulugh Beg. Of it Curzon said he found it still in his time, even in ruin, the noblest public square in the world, a triumph of massive simplicity and grandeur with which nothing in Europe, save

perhaps the Piazza of St. Mark's at Venice, and that on a 175
humbler scale, could even aspire to compete. Others have 316
written of the tombs of the city, the Shahzinda[1] mausoleum and the rest. Every witness has striven, as did Curzon, to pass on a vision of the Samarkandian tiles — 'turquoise and sapphire, green, plum-coloured and orange, crusted over with a rich siliceous glaze, and inscribed with mighty Kufic letters — by which these glorious structures were once wholly and are still in part adorned'.[2]

In Tsarist times it was complained that the Russians had 000
done nothing to preserve these great relics from demolition and decay, and further damage was done during the interregnum between the fall of Tsardom and the consolidation of Soviet power. Fortunately, there is reason to believe from later observation, reinforced by the evidence of local publications, that the Soviets have awoken to this heritage. The climate itself, dry and comparatively soft, is probably as favourable to ancient buildings as any in the world; the damage comes from earthquakes, which in that country are frequent and severe.

In the eyes of Eastern Turks Timur is the great assimilator. 829
The policy they see worked out in the conqueror's hands is that of the adaptation of Turkish culture to the traditions of Islam, a synthesis of Turkish valour with Arab-Persian civilization. Timur, having conquered, set aside his barbarities, and aimed at the ennoblement of the Turkish political tradition by infusing it with the stream of Islamic thought, in his time modern. But this was a confluence, not a blending, of two living currents, each indeed colouring the other at the margins, but flowing side by side and apart towards the sea. This twofold influence, they hold, has enabled the most representative Turks of this and indeed of all ages, to remain conscious of the things of the spirit, but to draw a clear distinction between religion and politics.

The conquests of Timur in the field of battle were more 175
fleeting than those of Chingiz who preceded him. Even the

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[1] Cf. Bib. I, 54, p. 86.

Op. cit. p. 226.

●175 clash between Eastern and Western Turk at Ankara, where Timur defeated the Ottoman Bayezid in 1402, had small significance. He returned to die three years later at Otrar on the Sir Darya, while the Ottomans, girding up their loins, half a century later finally shattered the Byzantines by storming Constantinople, and went on to thunder at the gates of Vienna. Yet it is rightly said that Timur left a heritage, greater than that of a warrior. It is enough to name his grandson Ulugh Beg, builder, scientist and astronomer; the [538] Timurid the Sultan Hussain Baikara (1438–1506), with his splendid city at Herat and the great literature fostered there by the poet Alishir Nevai; Hussain's cousin that other Timurid, Babur (1482–1530), author of the Memoirs and founder of the Chaghatai Empire in Hindustan. All these men were Turks self-confessed, they thought and spoke and wrote in the Eastern Turkic language called by the Mongol name Chaghatai. The annals of this house were rendered illustrious by the names of poets, philosophers and theologians, still household words throughout the East.[1]

000 It was a glorious flowering. There is need to live in Muslim lands in order to understand how close are the deeds and words of the men of the classic age to the minds of men today, closer in some strange way than are the Elizabethans to us. The reason for this nearness may be found perhaps in the fact that deeds and words in the East have been handed on so much by word of mouth, and a man will speak of forebears who lived centuries ago as if he had known them as a child. Thus the flowering of the Timurid age is to the Eastern Turks what the Elizabethans are to us, and more: it was a positive achievement for all time which cannot be annulled, a guarantee which later men may strive to redeem. To those who are lost it still provides a rallying-point.

(iv) *Period of Dissolution*

175 Much of the first part of Babur's Memoirs is occupied with stirring accounts of his struggles against Shaibak or Shaibani

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[1] Cf. Bib. I, 88, p. 180.

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Khan for the mastery of Samarkand, and indeed of the whole of Transoxiana. He was Babur's enemy, and Babur came off second-best. But, although Babur thought Shaibani a barbarian, condemning him for his rough and rude ways of dealing with the women-folk of those he defeated, he was too great a man to blacken an opponent. Shaibani appears in his story as a prince of great valour and of no mean military talent, whose defeat and death at Merv at Persian hands Babur is inclined to deplore. Shaibani traced his descent through his grandfather Abul Khair back to Juchi, the Mongol father of the Golden Horde, and was in the same line as Uzbek Khan. His ancestry may have been direct from Chingiz, but he was in fact an Uzbek and a Turk and was so regarded by Babur. His Uzbeks formed, as it were, a backwash from the Golden Horde, who during 300 years of mastery in Eastern Europe since Chingiz had not succeeded either in subduing the Russians or in assimilating themselves with them. The Uzbeks were a returning wave; they had gone out under Mongol leadership, they returned as Turks. It was this prince who after many struggles defeated Babur and Hussain Baikara and took from them the whole of Transoxiana, Balkh and that part of Khorasan dependent on Herat. His successes encouraged him to challenge Ismail, the founder of the Safavid dynasty of Persia (1502–1736), and he was defeated and killed at the battle of Merv in 1510, some years before Babur entered India. The result was the loss of Khorasan and all the land south of the Amu to the Safavids, and the relegation of the newly arisen Uzbek power to the country north of that river. It was at this time that the pattern of the present frontier was laid down. Shah Ismail took Bukhara and Samarkand, but later negotiated with the next Shaibanid a frontier along the Amu and the mountains not very different from that now existing between the USSR and the Middle East. Herat and Balkh went to Persia, eventually to be incorporated in the Durrani Afghan Kingdom, the Amu and the Kopet Dagh becoming the limit of Uzbek rule to the south. Moreover, the growth of Shiism in Safavid Persia set up a theological barrier

● 175 between the orthodox of Bukhara and the Shiahs whom they regarded as Isfahani heretics, thus for the first time since the Arab conquest severing Transoxiana in the realm of thought from the south.

798 It is seldom realized how great has been the difference in outlook and ideology between Sunni and Shiah. Vambéry in 1863, on his way from Turkey through Persia in the garb of an Istanbul dervish, found himself spat upon as a supposed Sunni by Shiah wayfarers, while ten years later Schuyler in Turkistan was surprised to find that the orthodox pilgrim from Bukhara travelled to Mecca always by Istanbul or India rather than expose himself to Shiah taunts on the direct road through Persia. Thus even in Muslim times a curtain had begun to drop along the Oxus.

175 The Shaibanids ruled for a century from Bukhara, their greatest Khan being Abdullah, who before his death in 1598 succeeded in uniting Khorezm with Transoxiana. Like Akbar and Elizabeth of England, his contemporaries, Abdullah ruled for nearly half a century. He conquered Meshed, Herat and Badakhshan, and at the height of his power even had designs on Akbar's India. After his death began a period of anarchy, confused by fighting with the Persian Safavids for the possession of Khorezm, which in the end became independent under another line of Uzbek Shaibanids, of whom the best known was the historian Abulghazi (d. 1663). He and his successors reversed the tables, making Khorezm for a time the overlord of Bukhara. But, as we have seen, its prosperity had been undermined before this time — according to some in 1573 — by a change in the course of the river, a disaster which led to the abandonment of the old capital at Urgench and the rise of a new city at Khiva. By this name the Khanate was thereafter known.

At Bukhara, after Abdullah's death, the power of the Shaibanids rapidly waned. It gave way first to the Janids, and then to the Mangits, both Uzbek houses tracing descent from Shaibani on the distaff side. Two centuries of nonentities are lit by a single high-light, the invasion in 1740 of the great

Persian usurper Nadir Shah, himself of Turkmen blood of the Afshar clan, but Persianized. Nadir had just returned from his sack of Delhi and, having found the Ottoman Turks too hard a nut to crack, formed the ambition of carrying his arms to the north to the farthest point reached by Darius' Persia, beyond the Sir Darya. This he did unchecked by any serious reverse, but, except for building a gateway to the Bukhara citadel and (as legend tells) attempting the violation of Timur's tomb at Samarkand, he left no memorial other than an increased dislike for the Persian invader from the south. He himself was murdered by his Kizilbash troops in 1747, and his empire over Turkistan did not pass to the Kajars who succeeded him. But he left in Turkistan what he had left in India, native dynasties in slow decay, and a determination now stronger than ever to seal off Transoxiana from contact with the heretics of Khorasan. The curtain had already begun to fall.

A temporary revival after a period of disorder led to the rise of the last dynasty, the Mangit Emirs, in the person of the Emir Masum in 1784. This dynasty lasted until 1921. These nominally Uzbek chieftains of Bukhara had to face a threefold danger, the first from various tribal confederacies of the north which had never entered the oases and by then were called Kazaks, the second from rebellious Tajik subjects in the more hilly regions to the east, the third a continuous threat, both to Khiva and Bukhara, from the Turkmens dwelling in the Merv, Tejen and Akhal oases south of the Karakum. These sometimes raided in their own interest, at others they were enlisted as mercenaries by contending Khans. Though of the race from which came the founders of the most powerful Turkish Empires, the Seljuk and the Ottoman, in their own country the Turkmens never succeeded in establishing anything more than the loosest of tribal organizations.. But, as the Russians found later at Gök Tepe, they were no mean warriors, and they kept the sedentary people of city and oasis in continual alarm. This state of things gave birth to a sort of feudal system very like that of the Khans and Begs before the rise of Timur, the Bukhara Emir relying increasingly on local chiefs,

● 175 his own writ being circumscribed by the edges of the cultivation around the city. The cities became more and more Tajik in character, and the Emirs themselves, as their portraits show, took on the appearance of Tajiks, losing tneir Turkish ruggedness. Within the city a fanatical priesthood fulminated from three hundred mosques and *medreses*, and the methods of government, jealous of all foreign influence, were scarcel even medieval. The condemned were torn to pieces or hurle to death from the Great Minar, and torture was the indispensable accompaniment of justice. The Emir Nasrullah (1826–60) is remembered chiefly for his vermin-chamber, the bug-pit to which in 1842 he condemned the two Englishmen, Stoddart and Conolly, to suffer in agony for months before beheading them. Under such a government Bukhara was soon unable to control even the Farghana Valley, in which a hereditary line of Khans, known as the Min, was established at Kokand about the year 1700 and became independent before the century had passed.

At the opening of the XVIIIth century the country under some form of Eastern Turkish domination still extended from the Caspian in the west almost to the Gobi in the east, and from the Hindu Kush and Kuenlun in the south to the Russian frontiers in Siberia in the north. Over against this the Russian outposts had stretched out right across Siberia early in the XVIIth century, and reached the Pacific almost simultaneously with the rise to power of the Manchu or Ching dynasty in China in 1643. (The actual year in which a Russian Cortez first stared at the Pacific is variously given; 1638 seems the best authenticated.) But all this great territory of the Eastern Turks was in a state of cultural decadence and military confusion. In the Turanian basin itself the control over the sedentary population was in the hands of the three petty rulers, the Emir of Bukhara and Khans of Khiva and Kokand; on the Kazak and Turkmen steppe companies of armed graziers wandered without much cohesion, sometimes banded together to meet emergencies under Khans who were able to impose a loose authority by force of character or temporary

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wealth. I have tried to show how the decline of Turkistan had begun with the substitution of sea-routes for caravan-roads by the Il Khans after the Mongol invasion; this process was carried further by the European discovery of the maritime route to India round the Cape and the establishment of the Dutch, French and English Companies in the XVIIth century. Even so the land-routes across Asia might have retained a limited importance. But the Silk Road received its death-blow when the Russians pushed their power eastward to China and the Pacific. Russian domination in Siberia had now provided a new land-route from west to east passing north of Turkistan. The old caravan routes on which prosperity had depended were almost forgotten, the petty wars between the little States and the raids from the steppe scarcely permitting of their use even for local commerce. Turkistan was in eclipse and seclusion. There remained on the steppe incomparable human material, but no adequate equation had been worked out between that rough material and the culture, most rich in its way, of the cities at the steppe's edge. Here was a political vacuum which would in the end be filled from without.

Meanwhile, unconscious of the fate impending and closely walled from the steppe, there remained only the shell of past glories, a string of flat-roofed cities, fed by a rich but scanty cultivation, the haunt of a narrow bigotry, and dominated by minarets which served for the execution of criminals and the call to prayer alike.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

Kalmyk

biddings of a narrow priesthood. The fact that, for decades 000 or even for centuries, the steppe acted as an insulator between Russia and its Siberian prolongation on the one hand and the fertility of Farghana, Zarafshan and the two rivers on the other goes far to explain the almost 'Erewhon' character of the culture of Transoxiana. For the steppe-ocean was no longer a path of commerce; unlike the sea it separated and did not unify.

To the south there should have been for compensation 101 the gravitational attraction of the other Islamic lands ranged between India and Istanbul. But where communications to the south and west were easy, as into Persia and Azerbaijan, the effect of this attraction was neutralized by the Shiah tradition which repelled rather than attracted the Sunnis of Bukhara. Farther east Kabul and India were divided from Turkistan by the barrier of the Hindu Kush, which Babur was the last of the great conquerors to surmount. A limited trade by caravan between Bukhara and Peshawar was continued into the XXth century, but the empire of Babur's successors in India, and after them the Afghan Durranis in Kabul, jealously kept the Uzbeks at arm's length. The Uzbeks themselves broke into small pieces, a fragmentation which made their absorption inevitable at the hands of any expansionist State in a position to overcome the obstacles of geography. At first there seemed some doubt whether that State would be China or Russia; in the end it proved to be Russia.

The resistance of the Kazaks on the northern steppe was 175 greatly weakened by the Kalmuck migrations, first from Mongolia to the Volga a little before 1700, and then back again in response to a Chinese invitation in the year 1771. The Kalmuck story in all its hideous horror has been immortalized in De Quincey's famous essay, 'Revolt of the Tartars'. These people were a remnant (*Kalmak* meaning in Turkish 'to remain') of the Oirat Mongol confederacy which, for two centuries between 1450 and 1650, stubbornly disputed with China the mastery of Peking. They seem to have been used

Kalmyk

175 as a pawn in the struggle for position between China and Russia which followed the Russian advance to the Pacific. Unlike their Mongol predecessors under Chingiz, they were never absorbed in Turkdom nor did they embrace Islam; they took title and inspiration from the Dalai Lama of Tibet and remained Buddhists of the Greater Way. But although they maintained their High Asian tradition and their identity, their story provides yet another instance of those raindrops on the window which separate only to meet. The bitter slaughter which went on between Kalmuck and Kazak weakened both and opened the steppe to penetration. But there was also an element of attraction, for at the same time Kazaks constantly married Kalmuck women abducted from Jungaria or the Volga steppe, and their sturdy Mongol physique and appearance is to be attributed to this coalescence.[1]

Throughout the XVIIIth century the Russians, moving in where all was disorder on the steppe, were busily engaged in strengthening the right flank of their long line of communication through Siberia (they had reached the Pacific in the XVIIth century). They had only to carry into Asia the tactics so well proved against the Golden Horde during the conflicts of five centuries on the Volga steppe. In 1716 they built Omsk in the Irtish basin, in 1718 Semipalatinsk, in 1724 Orenburg (now Chkalov), in 1734 Orsk, in 1753 Petropavlosk[2]. These places are situated roughly on, or along the southern flank of, the subsequent alignment of the Trans-Siberian Railway, and for many years the advance was confined to this west-east line. But, as Russia recovered from the Napoleonic invasion, her outposts in Asia moved gradually farther south, until in 1842 the frontier had reached the northern coasts of the Aral Sea and in 1847 had been pushed forward to command the lower reaches of the Sir Darya. In 1853 control was assumed of the waterway of the Sir Darya for a distance of 280 miles

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[1] Cf. Schuyler, *op. cit.* i, 34-5. (Where he speaks of Kirghiz he uses the old Tsarist nomenclature, meaning Kazak.)

[2] See Railway map on p. 192.

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RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN CENTRAL ASIA

1734 to 1920


54°
66°
78°
44°
36°
1734 to 1842
To 1847
To 1853
L. BALKHASH
YEDI-SU AND ILI
1854
CASPIAN SEA
ARAL SEA
Sir Darya
UST YURT
1863
KHIVA
1873
TRANSOXIANA AND SAMARKAND
1868
CHIMKENT AND ISSIK KÖL
Chimkent 1863
L. ISSIK KÖL
TASHKENT 1865
Tashkent
KOKAND
1875-6
Kokand
1877
TRANSCASPIA
1881
Bukhara
Samarkand
BUKHARA
1920
(Reduced to Vassalage 1869)
Amu Darya
MERV
1884
Merv
PAMIRS
1895
CHINA
PERSIA
PENJDEH
1885
Penjdeh
AFGHANISTAN
INDIA

Adapted from Fraser-Tytler's Afghanistan

EMERY WALKER LTD., SC.

175 from its mouth, and in the following year a Russian expedition penetrated into the Ili Valley. The Crimean War then arrested progress, but by 1863 the line had reached Chimkent and the northern oases, and included parts of the Tienshan and Lake Issik Köl.

175 538 829 These advances on the Kazak steppe and into the mountains had not been achieved without a struggle. A strenuous resistance was put up by the Kazak Khan, Kine Sari, whose name is celebrated in many a ballad as the hero of these tribes. He was the grandson of the famous Abilay Khan, who late in the XVIIIth century had succeeded in delaying the Russian advance by means of a diplomatic alliance with China. Abilay's grave is beside that of Ahmed Yesevi in the shrine built by Timur at Yese, and his name has been eclipsed in Kazak story only by that of Kine Sari, his descendant. Kine Sari is to the Kazaks what the hero Shamil was to the people of the North Caucasus in their fifty years' struggle against Russian penetration ending in 1860. Until recently the Soviets looked favourably on the ballads and chronicles which extol the glory of these chieftains, but for the last few years the word has gone forth that literature of this kind is the worst form of bourgeois-nationalism. The Academies are forbidden to exalt writers who seek to hallow men who were nothing but feudal brigands engaged in a selfish warfare for their own pockets, a warfare directed not only against their big Russian brother but against the true interests of their own people. The Soviet press, central and local, is full of fulminations against the glorification of the misguided bandits who in the name of a petty tribalism resisted what is represented as the inevitable absorption of their country in a higher culture.

Kine Sari's period of renown lasted for the decade 1837 to 1846. His resistance was based on tribal fastnesses set up in the recesses of the Kara Tav and the northern part of the Ulu Tav, and for a while he maintained his position against the Russians as far west as the Ural River. In the end he fell in fratricidal strife with the Kirghiz of the Issik Köl region. He is famous for his exchange of words with the envoy sent

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by Beymembet, a Kazak who had gone over to the Russians 175
and came to him with proposals for an armistice. In his letter 538
Beymembet had written — Can the horned ram, head of a 829
great herd though he be, overcome the lion? The end of rebellion is evil. Kine Sari quietly read the letter, turned to the envoy, and replied — He who sets a trap awry leaves his manhood in it. Is it not better to die in battle or upon the wastes of the steppe than face dishonour and be a slave?[1]

Even the Kirghiz who later slew him, and the Sarts of Tashkent who took him prisoner and murdered his father Kasim, revere Kine Sari as the national hero of all Turkistan. His death at the hands of the Kirghiz shows well enough how futile in action was this inchoate tribal resistance to the Russian advance. But that his name lives on today in the peoples' hearts is clear from the childish iterations of a Russian propaganda that never ceases to condemn his legend as a shameful survival from an unregenerate age.

The Russian Chancelleries felt that these successive 175
advances, culminating in the capture of Chimkent, needed some justification before world opinion. This was provided in the well-known memorandum of the Tsar's Chancellor, Prince Gorchakov, addressed in 1864 to the governments of the States with which Russia was in diplomatic relations. The substance of this memorandum is clear from the following citation:

> The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized states which come into contact with half-savage wandering tribes possessing no fixed social organization. It invariably happens in such cases that the interests of security on the frontier, and of commercial relations, compel the more civilized state to exercise a certain ascendancy over neighbours whose turbulence and nomad instincts render them difficult to live with.

Having so stated the problem in general terms, Gorchakov went on to claim that the solution had been found by moving the frontier beyond the nomads to locate it in a fertile country with a sedentary population. In this way he justified the

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[1] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 314.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL.1

● 175 assumption of authority on the Sir Darya and the capture of Chimkent. The nomads, he said, were now surrounded and the Russians 'found themselves confronted by a solid and compact social organization, offering conditions favourable to colonization and the supply of their garrison'.

Thus far, according to Gorchakov, and no farther. But the very next year saw the capture of Tashkent. Samarkand, forcibly detached from Bukhara, followed three years later. Bukhara itself at the time of Schuyler's visit in 1873 had been reduced to vassalage, and there followed in that same year the conquest of Khiva. Russian power was now on the Oxus and up against the Afghan frontier. Except for the Pamir region, too remote for penetration by the now satellite Bukharan State — a frontier settlement was made there between Russia and the Afghans under British auspices in 1895–6 — there remained only the Merv and Tejen oases on the Turkmen steppe between the Oxus and the Kopet Dagh. The absorption of these was delayed a few years by Russia's war with Turkey, and to some extent by the British advance into Afghanistan in the Second Afghan War. But during the decade that followed the Afghan War the Russians once more pressed forward to crush a spirited Turkmen resistance, until, after the conquest of Penjdeh in 1885, 'the only thing which could stop this expansion — the upward thrust of some equally powerful empire — challenged and arrested the mighty steam roller of Russia'.[1]

000 The play and counterplay of Russian and British forces in this region is more properly a part of the history of Persia and Afghanistan. Although Gorchakov failed to press his own argument to its conclusion, he was right in claiming a certain inevitability for the absorption by Russia of Central Asia up to the limit where some counter-force of stabilization should be encountered. The points at which the two forces did in fact meet are sufficiently demonstrated by the map, both on the southern and the eastern sides. It is now more profitable to consider how far the withdrawal of British power from

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[1] Fraser-Tytler, *op. cit.* p. 129, likely to become the *locus classicus* on this subject.

India has made to quiver once more a balance that had come 000 to rest. For the moment it is enough to observe that of all her land frontiers this, with that of Transcaucasia, is the only one on which Soviet Russia has not, whether by annexation or by means of satellites, advanced her outposts beyond the line established by the Tsars.

The campaigns in Khiva, Kokand (Farghana) and on the 175 Turkmen steppe were conducted with much ferocity on both sides.[1] The capture of Khiva in 1873 was scarcely opposed by the people of the oasis; the difficulties were due to the great ring of desert surrounding it, and the fierce Turkmen raiders who roamed upon the desert. Up to 1717 there had already been three Cossack expeditions which fared disastrously. On one of these the Cossacks, laden with spoils and a thousand women, were cut off from water and perished to a man; on another the Cossacks lost the road and were reduced by hunger to kill and eat each other. In 1717 Prince Bekovich succeeded in reaching and occupying the city for Peter the Great, only to have his troops set upon and exterminated after peace was made. The Prince's head was cut off and sent as a present to the Bukhara Emir, who refused to accept it! This disaster deterred the Russians for over 100 years: in 1839 an expedition under Perovsky, thinking Russian soldiers could endure the cold, advanced in midwinter but had to return, its goal unreached, after losing the whole of its camel transport and more than half its men. Throughout the next thirty years the Khivans showed their defiance by making captive and enslaving all the Russians who came into their hands. In 1873 Kaufmann, the Governor-General and after Chernaiev[2] the father of Russian Central Asia,

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[1] There are good accounts in Schuyler of the Kokand and Khiva campaigns, and in Curzon of the Turkmen campaign. Barbarities on the Russian side are vouched for by the chief Russian actors themselves. Schuyler gives the Perovsky expedition the date 1829, ten years too early.

[2] *Chernaiev*, the first Governor-General (1865, and again in 1882–4), a gallant and chivalrous soldier whom all admired. The Uzbeks spoke of him familiarly by the nickname *Shernaib*, the Lion Viceroy. *Kaufmann*, Governor-General 1867–82, cold, calculating, ruthless, vastly ambitious, a very able consolidator. His name stinks in Central Asia to this day. The last Governor-General was *Kuropatkin* (1914–17), the Varus of the Russo-Japanese war.

●175 determined on the *coup de grâce*. Four separate columns were to converge on Khiva, from Chekishler on the Caspian near the Persian frontier, from the Mangishlak Peninsula farther north, from Orenburg and, under Kaufmann himself, from Tashkent. The command of the whole was under Kaufmann, who gave strict orders that any other column reaching its goal before he himself arrived was to defer its assault.

Of these only the Orenburg column, better provided and marching down the west coast of the Aral Sea, succeeded in arriving at its destination without terrible losses from heat and thirst. On the way its commander managed to pick up the Mangishlak column, and on reaching Khiva found himself compelled to attack the city before the Tashkent column could arrive. It was only by a happy chance and not good management that Kaufmann reached Khiva at all, his troops decimated by hardships encountered in the Kizilkum on the way. The Chekishler column had to turn back, harried by Turkmen horsemen and stricken by sunstroke, the troops having thrown away their arms and abandoned their camels in the Karakum desert. The expedition was not the first to establish the incapacity of Russians to provide for campaigning under a pitiless sun. But the success of the Orenburg column, for which Kaufmann himself could claim no credit, enabled him to obtain the surrender of the Khan and the reduction of Khiva to Russian vassalage.

The campaign was marred by the subsequent measures taken by Kaufmann to subdue what he called the pride and license of the Turkmens who had hovered on the flanks of his columns and caused them many losses. He first imposed on them a fine in cash which he knew the Turkmens, whose property was in kind, could not pay. Then, by a breach of faith, he directed his forces to attack them before the date given for payment of the fine had run out. Worst of all, he issued orders, in writing as all his campaign orders were [1]—

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[1] Schuyler explains how the excessive Russian habit of writing formal orders on campaigns compelled every commander to carry a large secretariat in the field. He saw masses of great volumes comprising the orders for this campaign. Cf. *op. cit.* ii, 357.

and there is therefore no escape — 'to give over the Yomud [Turkmen] settlements, and their families, to complete destruction'. He followed this up by orders for extermination in case of the least resistance. The execution of this order resulted in a slaughter by the Cossacks, sparing neither age nor sex. MacGahan, the American freelance and hero of the *Ride to Khiva*, who was present on the occasion, describes how the subordinate commanders in the field proceeded to an indiscriminate butchery, and how he saw women and children go down before the Cossacks who rushed about like madmen.

Savagery of this order lives in the memory of later generations.

The most distinguished Russian officer in the Turkistan wars was undoubtedly Skobelev. He was present at Khiva, and took a leading part in the later Kokand campaign, where he brought resistance to an end by a ruthless bombardment of the cities and bazaars. The new Russian city in the Farghana Valley, founded near Margilan after the Kokand campaign, was named Skobelev after him (the Soviets changed it first to New Margilan, and later to Farghana). It was Skobelev too who in January 1881, after Lomakin had failed, finally overcame Turkmen resistance at Gök Tepe, the famous Tekke fortress. The curious reader will find the full details given in Curzon's work,[1] much of it reproduced from Skobelev's own words. When the fortress was stormed in the face of the utmost gallantry on the part of ill-armed defenders, the order was given to pursue the retreating enemy and give no quarter, an order pursued with savage precision over eleven miles until darkness fell. The morning found 8000 persons of both sexes and all ages cut down in rows like fresh-mown hay. Within the fort too all who did not escape were slaughtered to a man.

Skobelev himself explained his policy by saying:

> I hold it a principle that in Asia the duration of peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict upon the enemy.

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[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 78 *et seqq.*

175 Strike hard, and keep on striking till resistance fails; then form ranks, cease slaughter and be kind and humane to the prostrate enemy.

000 Curzon remarks that no greater contrast could be imagined to the British method, which is to strike a series of taps, to prohibit slaughter, and to abstain no less wholly from subsequent fraternization. Much could be written on the practical and moral issues involved in this debate, but one thing must surely be clear. The memory of deliberate cruelty does not fade.

Skobelev was a character whom Gibbon would have delighted to portray. He rode to battle clad in white, scented and curled as a bridegroom to a wedding, his voice tremulous, his eyes gleaming so that the Turkmens knew him as Göz Kanli — Bloody-eyes. His white uniform he matched against his horse, always a grey, and mounted he seemed magnificent. Boulangier, a French engineer, writing of him at the crisis of the siege of Gök Tepe, says that at that solemn moment Skobelev shone so splendidly in the eyes of his men that he seemed to their imagination to be the god of war. After Gök Tepe, like Alexander, he exclaimed against boredom, protesting there was nothing left for him to do. His exploits in the field attest his personal courage and his contempt for danger, and, like Napoleon, he exercised a magnetic influence over his troops by his mere presence. His friends he treated with alternate affection and contempt, the transition being reflected in his countenance, which was now beautiful, now ugly, and in his physical condition, which oscillated between masculine vigour and nervous exhaustion. He was for years the darling of the army and a political idol whom to criticize was blasphemy. Yet, a general at 30, he died in a low haunt and discreditably at the age of 38.

In a prophetic passage written more than sixty years ago, Curzon claims Skobelev as typical of the Russian nation, with one foot planted in a barbarian past, the past of Chingiz Khan, while the other is advancing into a new world of ideas and action. And, surely, this extraordinary man was not only a meteor; he was the lodestar of a creed destined to sway many worshippers. It is not visionary to suggest that those who made him their idol must even then have been troubled by a sense of strain mingling with their hero-worship, not unlike that atmosphere of anxious adoration which was to surround a later figure, in the Kremlin.

But here too, even beside the blood and horror of Gök Tepe, there appears a worthier record of the essential kindliness of the Russian common man. After the butchery soldiers were to be seen patting and comforting the few children surviving after their parents had been slaughtered, and there is evidence that the Russian fighting man's spirit of comradeship after the war won affection and respect from the very tribesmen who, a few years before, had most stoutly contested his advance. Even from the ranks of Tartary there comes an unwilling tribute[1]— The Russian himself is not really such a bad fellow: what makes him a nightmare to his neighbours is his notion of imperialism which for four centuries has preached to him the possibility of growth and expansion.

The defeat of the Turkmens at Gök Tepe in 1881 was the 175
first thrust of the final Russian deployment which was to round off the occupation of the entire Turanian basin up to the point where the advance came face to face with the protective shield held out by the British from India. It was followed by two small advance-guard actions only, designed to test the firmness of British resistance, that to Merv in 1884, and the defeat of the Afghan force by Komarov at Penjdeh on the road to Herat on 30th March 1885. This famous incident almost brought Russia and Britain into war, but in the event wisdom on both sides prevailed. The Russians had reached the outer fringes of the mountain barrier south of Turkistan and had subdued their most doughty opponents, the Tekke Turkmens; the British were still able to support an Afghan kingdom behind the Hindu Kush and the Oxus, which should

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[1] Togan, *op. cit.* p. 592.

175 be free of Russian interference and so act as an effective buffer to their empire in India. A bargain between two equal sides was concluded by diplomacy, and the balance swung to rest. The final agreement, signed in July 1887, still left Balkh, inhabited by people of Turkish stock, and most of Badakhshan, inhabited mainly by Tajiks, to Afghanistan.

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131 There now remained only a small mountain area never penetrated by Turkish peoples. This was the high table-land of the Pamirs east of the Bukhara mountain country, hitherto a no-man's-land too distant for effective management by the Mangit Emirs of Bukhara and beyond the limits attained either by the Manchus working from Sinkiang or by the British from the Panjab. This remote region also finally fell to Russia, a narrow tongue of Afghanistan known as Wakhan being left as a cartographical buffer — it is little else — between the limits of British expansion in Gilgit and Chitral and Russian expansion on the Pamirs. Many writers have left the impression that there exists a point in this region where met 'the frontiers of three empires', namely, Russia, China, India[1] and indeed a fourth, Afghanistan. This was never the case. The Russian and Indian empires were parted by the finger of Wakhan, the Russian frontier having been so demarcated by a joint Anglo-Russian commission in the summer of 1895, rounding off the Russian dominion towards India but in this sector as elsewhere leaving Afghan territory in between. At one point the Wakhan tongue is only eight miles wide. Here, however, it is buttressed on the Pakistan side by the massive chain of the Hindu Kush, which in Tirich Mir rises to 25,000 ft. At another point farther east is an easy 12,000 ft. pass, the Baroghil, leading from northern Chitral into Wakhan, whence it is possible to look straight across on to Russian territory on the Pamirs. The Russian territory north of Wakhan is now known as Gorno-Badakhshan, or Hill Badakhshan, and is inhabited by Tajiks and pockets of odd mountain peoples, like their neighbours in Gilgit and
Chitral not of Turkish stock and often Ismailis, followers of the Aga Khan.

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[1] Now Pakistan, which succeeded to the hegemony of Chitral and controls the Gilgit passes north of Kashmir.

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Chitral not of Turkish stock and often Ismailis, followers of the Agha Khan.

We see then that the whole process of the Russian occupation of the Turanian basin occupied nearly 200 years from the early XVIIIth century, when the posts were established east of the Urals along the direct road through Siberia, to the occupation of the line of the Oxus and the Kopet Dagh. It took place in two stages. The first part of the process, in its beginning, was nothing but an eastward expansion over the same Eurasian continent of the gradual Russification of the Tatar steppe, which had already taken place west of the Urals. In the second and subsequent movement there was something new, for the Russians, having conquered the Kazak steppe, moved on into Transoxiana and Farghana, and brought the sedentary populations also under their control. One result of the earlier pressures on the Kazaks was to force the nomads southward into the irrigated areas, so increasing the sedentary population, and leaving vacant spaces on the northern steppes. And there is an important distinction between north and south, to be constantly borne in mind. The Kazaks on the steppe have now been mingled with Russians for over two hundred years, while the conquest of the south was achieved only in 1865–86 and is therefore less than a hundred years old even today. Indeed the actual annexation of Khiva and Bukhara to the Russian Empire did not take place until after the Soviet reconquest of these States during the period 1918–24. We may therefore affirm that the final consolidation of Turkistan under Russian rule is barely thirty years old, and had to wait for the fall of Tsardom to be achieved.

But that is to anticipate. The effect of the Russian impetus under the Tsars was to bring the whole of the Turanian basin, except Balkh and the Bukhara and Khiva satellites, under direct Russian administration from a capital at Tashkent. The Kokand State in Farghana had been destroyed, and Samarkand had been wrenched from Bukhara, both Samarkand and Farghana therefore being Russian territory. Bukhara and Khiva survived as vassal States under close Russian control in

175 their external relations, but without much interference at that time with the anachronistic orientalism of their governments in the administration of justice within the limits of each State. 000 Indeed it has been held that, while the Russians under the Tsars posed as protectors of the Muhammadan law, the Sheriat, there is reason for attributing to them a real policy of maintaining the conditions of the Middle Ages in a city such as Bukhara, a hotbed of clerical reaction. The object of such a policy would be to encourage societies of this kind to rot internally and finally to break up of themselves under a new impact, like a mummy exposed to the air. It is not without interest to observe that a visit to Bukhara just before World War II led Fitzroy Maclean[1] to ascribe the same continuing motive to the Soviets in that city.

175 166 The distinction noted between the steppe and the oases was carried through into Russian policy. The Kazak nomads of the vast northern *dala*, already disorganized by the Kalmuck invasions and lacking the stability afforded by a settled cultivation with its attendant towns and forts, fell easy prey to the invaders. Many of them were forced south, and their places were taken by Russian and Ukrainian colonists, the settlement of whom became the fixed policy of Petersburg and proceeded steadily up to 1914. Towards the close of the XIXth century a scientific investigation was made of the availability of Kazak land for purposes of European colonization, ostensibly not without regard to the then existing population of Kazaks (these were wrongly known to the Russians of that time as Kirghiz). This subject formed the terms of reference of two weighty commissions of enquiry under two investigators named Shcherbina and Kuznetzev. These commissioners produced monumental reports in the best Germanic manner, complete with maps and extending to many volumes. But, says the commentator, though these claim to be highly scientific, they are thoroughly tendentious, and from beginning to end are written from the executioner's point of view. The authors set out to prove that the Kazaks are not the original

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[1] Bib. I, 65, p. 149.

owners of the land, and their needs for a minimum subsistence 175
are reckoned with a view to getting rid of them. On this 166
basis 14 million hectares on the steppe were confiscated by decree, and two million Russian immigrants brought in. A [000]
more humane, and less scientific, Russian named Zwilling in 1911 compared these methods to that of the Jew who tried to accustom his ass to lower standards of nourishment by giving it a lower and lower ration, and eventually nothing at all. When the ass got used to eating nothing, it died.[1]

The real policy comes out in the outburst of Kriukov,[2] 175
President of the Agricultural Administration in 1907, in which he accused the Kazaks of being the descendants of Chingiz and Timur and therefore deserving only of destruction. When in 1916 the Kirghiz rose against the Tsar's conscription order, and their old leader, Kanat son of Ayuke, was captured on the Chu River and brought to trial, he accused his Russian judges of leaving him and his people no place to lay their heads, and later in despair committed suicide by dashing himself against the prison wall.

When in the period 1865–86 Transoxiana and the Turkmen steppe in their turn fell to the Russians, the government at first compromised with tradition by leaving Bukhara (with its mountainous extension to the east) and Khiva as 'native states' under their princes. The rest of the oasis country was brought under direct administration but there was not at that time a serious attempt to do much here in the way of Russian colonization. Indeed, as is usual in the oases of Asia, the already existing sedentary population was thick on the ground, and was engaged in an intensive system of agriculture little above subsistence level. But, just as Tsarist pressure on the steppe had taken the form of infiltration, so in the southern and submontane regions it was exercised by means of a turnover from grain to cotton cultivation, particularly in the rich Farghana Vale with its suitable climate and the natural irrigation brought from the rivers issuing from the surrounding mountains. Already emerging into leadership under the Min

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[1] Togan, *op. cit.* pp. 301-3.

[2] *Ibid.*

175 Khans, Farghana in the Russian era has achieved first place in the economic life of Turkistan, agricultural and more recently industrial also. In many respects, ringed round by protecting hills and watered by streams from every quarter, it is like a larger and even more fertile edition of the vale of Peshawar farther south, even to the narrow exit for the waters at Khojent (Leninabad) — a northern Attock — and its central desert only waiting for the water that gives life — another Yusufzai *maira*.[1]

There was much behind this policy. It was not only cotton that the Russians needed; they sought to impose a measure of economic dependence. The cultivation of cotton was pressed by the appeal of higher prices and the fact that it requires less water and less labour than that of grain — much less water than rice. The consequent diminution in the area under grain entailed the import of corn from Russia to meet a marginal deficiency which was high enough at the time of the Revolution to bring famine to the country when grain imports failed owing to breakdown in communications. This policy could not fail to set Turkistan in economic tutelage to Russia in the elementary matter of the basic food supply.

175 If it was to become the main source of the all-important
496 raw material of cotton, Turkistan required above all a means of rapid transport to Europe. We have seen how the Russian advance came from the north along the line of the Sir Darya, and pre-dated by some decades the conquest of the Turkmen steppe. At first the plan was to use the Sir Darya, and after the conquest of Khiva and the practical absorption of Bukhara in 1873 the streams of the Amu Darya, as channels of river navigation, both fed by a flotilla on the Aral Sea. But the Sir Darya was so beset with shoals that even today the difficulty of navigating it has not been properly surmounted and, although the Amu Darya is rather more satisfactory as a waterway, it too did not then provide the solution that was needed, nor indeed is the Aral Sea ideally situated as an

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[1] Pashtu word for a barren rolling plain or steppe, equivalent to Persian *dasht* Kazak *dala*.

entrepôt of commerce. It followed that the practical problems 175 of railway construction had to be faced, and were indeed met, 496 by Tsarist Russia in Turkistan before they had presented themselves in the other parts of her Asiatic Empire. It is interesting that the Trans-Siberian Railway was not undertaken until 1891 and did not reach Vladivostok until just before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. The Trans-Caspian line, on the other hand, was begun in 1880 from an original terminus at Uzun Ada (later extended to Krasnovodsk), and reached Samarkand in 1888, whence it was extended subsequently both to Tashkent, the capital, and up the Farghana Valley to Andijan.

Thus railway construction in Russian Central Asia was carried out in inverse order to the initial penetration by force of arms. The Turkmen country, which was the last to be subdued, was the first to enjoy rail communications with the west, and that in spite of the interruption caused by the need to break the journey for the Caspian crossing from Baku. It was not until the end of 1905 that uninterrupted communication with the Russian railway network was achieved by means of a line skirting the Aral Sea and traversing the original road of the Russian advance up the Sir Darya and past the town of Turkistan to Tashkent.

The Russians had at first envisaged the initial approach as leading up the Sir Darya from the north, and did not commit themselves to the Trans-Caspian line without much thought and in the face of strong opposition from Chernaiev[1] and others. The Trans-Caspian project was largely tactical at the outset: it was put forward by their engineer Annenkov as a means of supplying the forces engaged against the Turkmens which had failed disastrously under Lomakin. When Skobelev took over in 1880, he lent his powerful support to the idea, not so much because he needed it to win his campaign — indeed he boasted, and fulfilled the boast, that he would subdue the Turkmens without such adventitious aids — as that his eyes had been opened to what seemed to him its strategic possibilities. It would afford a rapid means of consolidating and

[1] [first Governor-General of Turkistan (1865, 1882-84) -- Analyst

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advancing his successes on the Afghan frontier, and might even take him on to Herat. And, above all, it would enable him, from Transcaspia, to reach out to the heart of the country in Tashkent and Farghana. It would provide the rapid transport needed for supplying the farther outposts of the empire in Central Asia. As Curzon said — with the successes of Skobelev Transcaspia threw down her challenge to Turkistan.[1]

It is worth stressing the energy that the Russians put into railway construction in this area in the time of the Tsars.[2] For not only were the two main lines, the Trans-Caspian and the so-called Trans-Aral Railways, in being by 1906, but the Tsars had already proceeded far in the survey of the trunk now known as the Turk-Sib to join the Central Asian railways with Siberia by means of a line from Aris, near Chimkent, passing through Semipalatinsk to meet the Siberian Railway at Novosibirsk in the Kuzbas. Five-year plans seldom give credit for the actual work, or the preliminary survey, carried through by the régime which preceded them. The Turk-Sib is an instance of this tendency. Much advertised as a triumph of Soviet engineering, it was in fact completed not before 1930 on the basis of preparatory work carried out many years before under the Tsars. We shall see later that, in comparison with the pioneer work done in earlier times, railway construction by the Soviets in Central Asia has lagged behind.

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It remains to record two scenes in the act which closes when the curtain of the Russian Revolution drops over Central Asia.

The first of these was the rebellion in Farghana in 1898, known as the revolt of Dūkchi Ishan. Dūkchi Ishan was a village priest in the countryside near Andijan. His knowledge of theology was small, but he had a winning tongue and a strong faith both in his Islamic tenets and in the destiny of his people. There is a picture of him in Castagné's *Les Bas-*

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[1] *Op. cit.* p. 293.

[2] Cf. sketch map, Chapter XII, facing p. 192.

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matchis, a benign figure, heavily bearded and of a dark complexion, with big capable hands upon his knees, a typical *imam* of the old school, like many whose names have become household words among the Pathan tribes of the North-West Frontier. He was a curious mixture of Gandhi and St. Paul. A maker of ropes and tents whose purity and faith won the people's affection, he built his house upon a hill. Here he planted trees and made the hill blossom by carrying up water which he gave indiscriminately to his garden and to the thirsty wayfarer. Asked why he consorted with the poor, he replied that he had no trust in the well-to-do, and it was for a man to seek those like him and befriend those who draw near to him.

His following was composed of hill Kazaks and Kirghiz around the Narin displaced by Russian immigrants, and bankrupt farmers overtaken by a cotton slump. There was a sudden agrarian revolt by peasants and herdsmen often armed only with spades and pitchforks. They set the shaikh on a white horse and, proclaiming him as their Khan, attacked the barracks outside Andijan and massacred a number of troops.

Of course in Russia the revolt was crushed by troops, and its leader put to death. But nothing was done to ascertain the causes of it or to take measures which would remove the underlying discontent. Property became concentrated in official hands; poverty and crime increased. The province of Farghana became in Turkistan what Peshawar once was in India and that not only in its physical contours; its tale of violent crime was greater than that of any part of the Russian Empire. The fuse had been laid for the Basmachi rebellion of later years.

The second revolt was the immediate precursor of the Revolution itself, and broke out in 1916. It was directed against the Tsarist order calling up the people for noncombatant military service in World War I, and was known as the *Merdikar*[1] Revolt. Togan says that ostensibly as an

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[1] The word means 'man of work' in Persian. The suggestion is that it was used in the sense of conscript labour. Is it not possible that it was a slogan, 'Man of action', used by the rebels themselves?

● 175 act of grace, but really because the Russians had been alarmed
669 by the prowess of Kine Sari and his like, the tribes of Turkistan had been exempted from military service, and, in his view foolishly, regarded this as a privilege. Foolishly, because this charter did not exempt them from confiscations and plunder in kind, and, in any case, the exemption was in the end withdrawn. The Tsar's order directing mobilization of all males between 19 and 43 was regarded as the fatal and final spark which led to a general explosion.

The Kipchaks of the Kazak steppe came into prominence again under a leader Abdul Ghaffar, who for a short time succeeded in reviving the enthusiasms of the days of Kine Sari, eighty years before. There were sporadic revolts also in Farghana and the rest of the Uzbek country down the Amu as far as Khiva, and small bodies of Russian troops or colonists were murdered wherever found. The action taken in reprisal by the last Governor-General, Kuropatkin, was in the tradition of Skobelev, whose pupil he was, thousands of tribesmen being exterminated or driven into the wastes to die. There is no doubt that the strenuous military effort required of the Tsar's government to crush this rebellion at a time when Russia was at the crisis of her great struggle with Germany and Austria affected the course of the War. Internally, too, it may even be said that the diversion of troops was in itself a contributory cause of the fall of the Tsar and the success of the revolutionaries.

829 In the earlier years of the Soviet régime, when lip service
669 was still paid to nationalism, it was fashionable for Soviet writers to refer with enthusiastic approval to these nationalist movements of the pre-revolutionary era.[a] Even the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* in its first edition commended them as risings of the workers against the oppression of the Tsar's government. But this attitude is now condemned as a distortion, false coin to be withdrawn from circulation in common with the edition of the encyclopedia which gave it currency. These movements are now represented as reactionary risings of the feudal classes, dissatisfied by the diminution of the

[a] [i.e., of 1898 and 1916; see cat. 116, pp 88-90 —Analyst]

power of the Khans and clergy. Because it is true that the 829
Dükchi Ishan movement in particular was to some extent a 669
reaction inspired by the Turkic and Islamic traditions of the Farghana Valley, Soviet critics single it out for special castigation on the ground that its leaders aimed at the severance of the peoples of Central Asia from Russia and the Great Russian people — an aim which official teaching now proclaims to have been without validity even in Tsarist times. We shall observe later the development in Soviet hands of a first principle of historical dialectics,[1] designed and applied to establish that Tsarist conquests and suppressions of local nationalism were but the first and right stage in a process leading inevitably to the present Soviet national policy.

As the year 1917 went by, the rebellion was succeeded by 175 ●
widespread famine. The economy of Turkistan, exporting cotton for grain, was brittle in the extreme. World war and local revolt had together produced a situation in which most of the surplus grain was wanted to feed the armies on the Western front and even that which was left over could not be carried to Turkistan along railways that were cut and disorganized. It was not surprising that the brighter spirits among the more educated Turks in Central Asia denounced this revolt as wasted effort and after the October Revolution looked for kindred spirits among the Bolsheviks who would advance the cause of the freedom of the peoples of Turkistan.

And so, heralded by massacre and famine, looms up the 000
Soviet era in this homeland of the Turks. The Tsars in their time had done little to lift the curtain from a country that a long isolation had made mysterious. It was as if, inheriting the jealous exclusiveness of the Emirs before them, they had something serious to conceal. But in 1917 it seemed that the barriers were at last about to fall.

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[1] Known as the Conception of the Lesser Evil. See pp. 231-2.

[pages 92, 93, 94 = blank]

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

000 men, among the Eastern Turks of a perception fine enough to be able to look through that fog and knowing the landmarks to perceive a way that might have led them to safety. At that time the vision failed, but they have been able to give an account of wrong turnings taken which may avail their successors in some future time. In their company we begin to get a glimmering of what happened and to understand some of the reasons for the ultimate triumph of the Bolsheviks in Central Asia.

It is important to grasp the essentials of the very inauspicious circumstances existing in Turkistan when Tsardom was overthrown. The very fact that these conditions were so difficult renders the Soviet success the more remarkable, and one cannot deny a tribute to that astonishing combination of diplomatic ability and ruthlessness in action which in the end ensured their victory. Here was a land which had only been finally conquered by the Tsars a little more than thirty years before; conquest over tribal populations had been achieved at the cost of bitter and bloody clashes. The urban centres were traditionally the home of an ancient fanaticism of the more extreme kind. Much of the terrain was either desert or mountain and therefore hard for organized armed forces to
● 175 control. Only a year before the country had been swept by the storm of a bloody revolt[1] mercilessly crushed. Scarcely was the flame of revolt extinguished when railway communications, in themselves scant enough, broke down, and a severe famine swept a land whose most fertile areas had been given over to the production of a cash-crop, cotton. The situation was the more complex in that the Tsar's government had used Turkistan as the place of internment for thousands of prisoners of war, mainly Austrians, taken on the Western front and released shortly after the revolution in November 1917. During one of the most critical periods of the War (late 1917 and early 1918) and just when Russia was tottering out of it, these released prisoners provided a focus of intrigue for the agents of the Central Powers, Germany and Turkey, in their strenuous endeavours to create diversions on a territory

[1] [1916 -- Analyst]

leading to the Indian frontier. British anxiety on that score 175 led to what Russians have called the 'Intervention Period'. Lastly, Turkistan was to a great extent isolated from the effective deployment of Bolshevik force by the armies of White Russians and Cossacks operating under Denikin and Wrangel from north of the Black Sea and under Kolchak from Siberia. All these factors were unfavourable to the consolidation of Soviet power in Central Asia, and some of them might have been expected to encourage separatism.

There were, however, other factors. These are little known and in the end they told decisively in favour of the determination of the Kremlin, as we now know, to retain for the Revolution in spite of all professions every vestige of the imperial power to which they had succeeded. In the sphere of power, as in that of prophecy, the Soviets were to play the part of a more specious Elisha to the ruder Tsarist Elijah who had vanished from the earth.

In the Bolsheviks' favour was, first, the fact that Tsarist 175 education had produced few among the Turkish or Tajik population who were able to give effect to any modern conception of the organization of a State. There were plenty of pious doctors in the Muslim law, learned in the old ways, but there was no local or even municipal autonomy, no press and, among the Turks, very little higher education on Western lines. The number of 'intellectuals' among the indigenous people could be numbered on the fingers, while that other more ancient cement, the system of tribal authority, was disintegrating under the impact of the Russian wars and governments. In any case the tribal Khan did not count for much in the urban centres. There was consequently a real absence of experience in all that pertains to political architecture in a modern world. In the words of Mustafa Chokai, the leader of the Kokand government, the efforts of the men capable of thought or action at this level had to be directed entirely to the hurried creation of some sort of centre, to bringing together a group capable of uniting people unaccustomed to a political idea. At the moment when these leaders ought to have been

175 engaged on construction, they were not only without architects, they had to wear themselves out in hunting for masons and building materials.[1]

Secondly, although the military tradition of the Eastern Turks was a celebrated one, they had been excluded from Russian military service and they therefore had no cadres with modern military knowledge. Nor had they any share even in the subordinate grades in the working of the communications services, whether railway, telegraph or telephone : all these were by deliberate policy in Russian hands. Nor had they even been admitted to such few industrial organizations as existed, except as labourers under rigid subordination to Russian foremen. The Russian finger was on every control, whether civil, military, municipal or the communications machine.

Thirdly, there existed, outside the towns and away from the railways, a condition which was perhaps even more radical and decisive in the struggle which lay ahead. This sprang from the widespread colonization of the land by Russians under the Stolypin reforms of 1906 and previous agrarian settlements. It is true that Russians were thicker and longer established on the land upon the northern steppe and in the Ili Valley than in Transoxiana or Farghana, but even there in the oases, and in the glens around Farghana, the Russian population by the time of the Revolution was rapidly increasing. Although it suffered severe casualties in the 1916 rising, it had been compelled by those very dangers and difficulties to organize in opposition to the indigenous peoples. There was thus a fundamental difference of interest between the indigenous and the Russian populations in any colonized area. The Russians, moreover, had settled down as peasants, while the people of the soil tended more and more to be nomadic, some of them expropriated, others maintaining a traditional contempt for agriculture.

The result was that in the period of chaos following the Revolution the Russians in Turkistan looked for support to

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[1] Bib. II, 7, Tchokaieff.

any authority offering them protection against the indigenous 175
population. Some of them joined the Mensheviks and there was intensive murder and counter-murder between Menshevik and Bolshevik on this as on other stages. But, perhaps because of the greater Bolshevik aptitude in the making of fair promises (however belied in ruthless action), it was he who in the end prevailed with the Russians in Central Asia. Thus the nationalists among the Eastern Turks found their separatist aspirations in basic conflict with those of the provincial Bolsheviks.

The actual events which took place in Central Asia 000
between the February[1] (Kerensky) Revolution of 1917 and the death of Enver Pasha in August 1922 are so confused that a clear disentanglement is hard to make. The cross-currents were many, one of the most troublesome being the spate of political manifestos issued by the many mushroom organizations, both Russian and Turkish, during this period. Moreover, the continuous rewriting of history within the Soviet Union to fit each new adjustment of the Party line means that the Russian historians are more or less valueless whether as guides to fact or as delineators of perspective. Togan does 114
at least give us a narrative of a succession of personal experiences over a very wide field, for he travelled during those years over the whole country between the Urals and the Afghan frontier, he enjoyed intimate talks with Lenin and Stalin, he was a confidant of Enver Pasha, and finally he was closely concerned with the Basmachi movement. Perhaps most interesting of all, he was the mainspring of the Bashkurd government, which almost alone among the short-lived growths of those times took practical steps towards the creation of a military force, so compelling even Lenin and Stalin to take account of and temporize with its leaders.

It is only possible to find a way through this maze if it is 175
understood that the main forces operating among the Eastern 669

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[1] According to the Julian calendar, then in force in Russia, this event took place in the last days of February. The Soviets, having brought the calendar into line, often refer to it as the March Revolution.

175 Turks were four, that these forces usually pulled in diverse
667 directions, and that there was no sufficient overriding power to bring them together. The first force was that of the Turkish nobility and gentry, headed by Abdul Said Mir Alim Khan, the last of the Mangit line of the Emirs of Bukhara. The *ulema* or Muslim *religieux*, and the well-to-do merchants, were in general accord with this group, as were also the *kadis* and *begs* (the judges and magistrates in matters of Muslim personal law) and a number of Russian-educated Turks and Tajiks, many of them in subordinate Russian employ. With the exception of some of the more fanatical priests (who turned to the Basmachis), many of these looked to Russia for livelihood and security, and for that reason shunned national enterprise. At a critical moment the Emir refused to commit himself against the Tashkent Bolsheviks who held the key to the failure or success of the Red Revolution in Turkistan, his reason being that the established policy of Bukhara required him to recognize any force representing Moscow or Petersburg as the Russian government. 'He was afraid', says Togan, 'of the shadow of a dead Russian.'[1]

The second force was that of the northern nomads, mainly Kazak and Bashkurd, expropriated from their lands by Russian colonists, bound with loose tribal bonds, and bitter at heart. The Kazaks were ill-organized and had few leaders of more than tribal stature. The Bashkurds, as we shall see, did better. But the Ural steppe and hills did not provide them with sustenance or refuge sufficient to sustain any protracted campaign, the more so since the years of crisis were years of fearful famine brought on by the failure of the grain supply and general disorder.

The third force was that of the Basmachis.[2] Their stamping-ground was in the mountains and glens around the Farghana Valley, breeding a type of tribesman very like the Afridis and Wazirs of the North-West Frontier. These threw up obstinate leaders of great bravery, endurance and resource,

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 373.

[2] The word is usually derived from the Turkish verb *basmak*, to press, tread underfoot, attack, raid. A raider or highwayman.

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able even in times of shortage to retreat to lairs in the hill 175●
country less affected by famine than the steppe. Such were 669
Ibrahim Beg, the Uzbek Lakai chief, cunning and bitter, and the gallant Devletmand who fell with Enver at Beljuvan. The Basmachi tribal cohesion was sufficient to enable them to continue as a menace to the Soviets long after the death of Enver Pasha in 1922. Officially, Russia claimed to have extinguished them by 1924, but the spark was constantly lit again, and Ibrahim Beg did not succumb until 1931. There was talk on the Peshawar border of the continuance of the Basmachi movement as late as the time of Hitler's invasion of Russia in 1941, and even today the fire may not be wholly quenched. But the tribal virtues which sustain and prolong such resistance are not those which can supply the sinews of a modern or national State, and Togan's pages are full of the lament that the Basmachi force could only be mobilized in support of a lost cause like that of the Bukhara Emir, breaking in the hands of those whom he calls the intellectuals. That was the tragedy of Enver Pasha.

The fourth force should have been these very intellectuals (*münevverler*), not those who were in Russian service and sold to Russia, but those who sprang from the oppressed people themselves and might have crystallized their love of liberty into something modern and practical. Ali Khan Bukaikhan among the Kazaks, Chokai in Kokand, Obedullah Khoja in Tashkent, Osman Khoja in Bukhara, Khan Junaid in Khiva, Togan in the Bashkurd country — these were a few who essayed the task. The scales were weighted against them and in the end they failed.

The February Revolution in Russia was hailed with acclaim by these very men. Some of them had had experience in the short-lived Dumas of the Tsars in the first decade of the XXth century, and they were encouraged by the fact that Kerensky himself had grown up in Turkistan, his father being an inspector of Russian schools in that Tsarist province. Various congresses were held, and there was much manœuvring among the native nationals to play off one Russian party

175 against another. The Muslims of European Russia did not
669 back up their brethren in Asia. From their headquarters in Kazan they worked for a unitary government of Russia, within which they saw themselves, as close to the centre, occupying positions of great influence; they opposed the majority of the Eastern Turks, who came out with a programme of local autonomy within a federal framework. The real reason for the autonomy movement in Asiatic Russia was the native impulse to obtain power to retrieve the lands forfeited to Russian colonists, and there is a strong impression that Russians of all parties, white, pink or red, realizing this to be the living issue, were only playing for time and determined to prevent the local nationalists from getting effective control of land policy. The autonomists won the day in the Muslim congress at Moscow held in May 1917, but they were beating the air. The months went by in wordy preparations for a Constituent Assembly. Even the Kazaks took to the new ways, holding congresses as in the times of the steppe cavaliers on horseback in the open air, with a fat mare as a rostrum. Meanwhile in Khiva and Bukhara the efforts of the men of new idea were constantly frustrated by the conservative elements behind the Emir and the *ulema* in the south. And all the time famine conditions were growing worse, communications more difficult. In Tashkent, the Bolsheviks — the only purposeful group — played up to Uzbeks and Kazaks alike by professing their horror of Russian land encroachments, and of the failure to bring corn to the stricken land. There was also considerable Bolshevik success in appealing to the intellectuals with natural leanings to the left. It seemed better to work for Russian revolutionaries than for Mullahs and Begs who prayed for the Tsar.

When the October Revolution came, it was the Bolsheviks who succeeded to power in Tashkent in much the same fashion, and adopting much the same tactics, as in Russia itself. Their capture of Tashkent was to prove decisive. They succeeded in holding on to it throughout the troubles, even in the face of a revolt in January 1919 by their own War

Commissar, a youth of 23 named Ossipov who had been a Tsarist officer and cast in his lot with the Bolsheviks. Deciding the Bolsheviks were too doctrinaire for him, Ossipov turned against them, treacherously summoned their leaders to help him (as he said) suppress a meeting in the barracks, shot the lot, then, after one crowded hour of glorious life in command of the situation, gave away his advantage by getting superbly drunk and decamping with the money in the direction of Ashkabad. All this time the Bolshevik position in Tashkent was extremely precarious. Their communications were broken on both railways, White Russian, Cossack or native autonomies intervened between them and Moscow, the tribes in the hills were in revolt and food was scarce. It is not surprising that they shot all Ossipov's supporters without mercy. What is remarkable is that they successfully held on to their position and, when the tide turned in Russia itself, were thus enabled from Tashkent to reimpose throughout Turkistan the authority which they alone of the revolutionary groups had shown themselves capable of inheriting from imperial Russia. It is interesting that the actual force which pulled them through their crisis was made up largely of Hungarian and Austrian prisoners of war, who gave them loyal service in return for release and food in time of famine. 175 669

At Tashkent the Ossipov incident was the turning-point, and after it the Soviets in Turkistan, though they had anxious times to face against the Basmachis, had overcome the enemy within the gate and gradually strengthened their position. But, to go back, during the whole of 1918 which preceded it the Turkish leaders outside Tashkent had been striving with greater or less success to give effect to the local autonomies which were their dream, and (in addition to Bukhara and Khiva which still existed) had for a short time been able to set up at least the outward forms of three such States, the first at Kokand in Farghana, the second known as Alash Orda in the northern Kazak territory with its focus in Yedisu

175 669 (Semirechye), and the third in the Bashkurd country. During the first few months after the October Revolution, the Cossacks controlled Orenburg (Chkalov), cutting Red communications with Moscow; and after some vicissitudes the Mensheviks held on to the Turkmen country, cutting the railway to Krasnovodsk. The intellectuals therefore had their brief chance. 'Alash Orda' was proclaimed under Ali Khan Bukey Khan on 17th November 1917, the Bashkurd Republic with Togan as its chief inspirer four days later, and the Kokand Republic on 28th November under Mustafa Chokai.

The new State of Kokand lasted only two months, and lacking an army fell in February 1918 to a determined assault by the Bolsheviks under Ossipov — the same man who later raised the storm at Tashkent — launched from the neighbouring town, which at that time, not inappropriately, was named after Skobelev.[1] The Kokand government had been unable even to overwhelm the forty-five Bolshevik soldiers in the Kokand citadel, which held out until relieved by Ossipov. The chief actors fled in all directions. But it was largely the resurrection of a Kokand State for these few weeks that gave shape and inspiration to the Basmachi rebellion which rallied round one Irgesh, the police chief of the short-lived State.

The Alash Orda or Kazak State was never much more than a committee which held congresses and issued manifestos. Its capital was intended to be in the east at Semipalatinsk, but in fact its activities took place at Orenburg (Chkalov), where was also the seat of the Bashkurd government. Alash Orda was unable to organize any real executive power, or to obtain any working agreement with the many thousands of Russian colonists, who were determined not to yield control of Russian immigration or colonies to any Turkish authority.

The Bashkurd State was more of a reality. Its proclamation coincided almost exactly with the well-known Declara-

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[1] This town at various times has been known as Yeni (New) Margilan, Skobelev, and Farghana, the present name. The name Farghana confuses it with the whole valley. With the neighbouring town of Margilan it is now the main seat of the Soviet silk industry in Uzbekistan.

tion of 15th November 1917, signed by Lenin and (even so early) by Stalin also.

> The Council of Peoples Commissars [ran the Declaration] has decided to base its work in relation to the nationalities on the following principles:
>
> (1) Equality and sovereignty of the nations of Russia.
> (2) The right of the nations of Russia to free self-determination, *including the right to secede and form independent states*. . . .

This Declaration was followed by a manifesto specially addressed to 'All toiling Muhammadans in Russia and in the East', words that would read oddly in *Pravda* today:

> Muhammadans of Russia, Tatars of the Volga and the Crimea, Kirghiz[1] and Sarts of Turkistan, Turks and Tatars of Transcaucasia, all those whose mosques and prayer-houses were destroyed and whose religion and customs were trampled upon by the Russian Tsars and tyrants! Henceforth your faith and customs, your national and cultural institutions, are proclaimed free and inviolable. Build up your national life freely and unhindered. This is your right.

It was not surprising that the autonomists believed the golden age for them had dawned. They were soon undeceived. In February 1918, two months after this Declaration of Liberty, the Red Army defeated the Cossack general Dutov and occupied Orenburg. Declaring the Bashkurd government reactionary and nationalistic, the Bolsheviks arrested its members, including 'Velidov', and established a Revolutionary Soviet of Bashkiria, made up of Bashkurds subordinate to the Russian Soviet in the city. The plan was to win over to the Soviet cause the masses of the Ural country. But this Bashkurd Soviet in its turn began to display what would now be called a Tito mentality: for all parties the real political aim in the background was the control of the lands, whether by Bashkurds for their own people, or by Russians for the Russian

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[1] Kazaks are probably meant. The Russians used to confuse Kirghiz with Kazaks. At that time there were at least four times as many Kazaks as Kirghiz in Russian Central Asia.

● 175 669 colonists. Once again there was an interruption. The Russian Whites returned and (in April 1918), driving out the Bolsheviks from Orenburg, freed Togan and the original leaders of the national movement. Before long Togan had organized a number of efficient Bashkurd regiments (the Bashkurds had long enjoyed a special position in the Tsarist army, in which almost alone of Turkish peoples they had always served with distinction), and in this way he displayed a greater awareness than the other autonomists of his time of the essential measures needed to establish a State. These troops proceeded at first to fight for the Whites under Dutov and Kolchak, but soon found that the Right Wing of Russia, though possibly more honest in its statement of policies, was no more ready than the Left to sacrifice the interests of the large Russian colonial populations in the Urals and on the steppe beyond. The Bashkurd leaders were not capable of splitting ideological hairs with Russians; they were nationalists first and every time, and they had a precise aim, namely the control of their ancestral lands and the expulsion of the encroaching Russian colonists. They were in fact ready to mount any bandwagon that promised well, and they turned once more to the Reds when towards the end of 1918 the effort of Kolchak began to flag.

In these negotiations their hands were strengthened by their possession of a military force. Wielding this weapon, they succeeded in extracting from the Soviet leaders in February 1919 an agreement whereby the Bashkurd troops were merged in the Red Army but under their own command, and in return the Soviets recognized the autonomy of Bashkiria which would be governed by a native committee known as the Bashrevcom.

Thus it seemed that, in Bashkiria at least, after an initial setback a great end had been achieved. The agreement had conceded to the Bashkurd autonomists the control of everything within their territory except railroads, factories and mines, which were to remain under the All-Russian Commissariat. This was a far-reaching concession on the Soviet

side, and one that seemed to give way on the point of supreme 175
importance to the Bashkurds, that of the disposal of their lands. 669
But once more the native leaders had grasped the shadow only to lose the substance, and the Soviets knew what they were about. It is surprising that Togan, himself the main organizer of the Bashkurd Army, should have handed the only effective force in Turkish hands on a plate to a set of Bolshevik revolutionaries fighting desperately for their own survival. Again and again he says he could not trust them, yet here he gave away the only real card he ever had. It is a proof, if proof were needed, how bemused were the rising intellectuals among the Turks by the catchwords and slogans of the revolutionaries of the time.

Togan himself went with his troops to the Red Army. In Orenburg the Bashkurd leaders, once in the saddle, embarked on an attempt to realize their programme for the compulsory expropriation of all the Russian colonists in Bashkiria. They strove at the same time to aid in the formation of a real Alash Orda state in Kazakistan, but the number of Russian colonists on the steppe was far too large to allow of the establishment by the Kazak leaders of any real authority in that country. In fact, as we have seen, the separatists' ambitions were in fundamental conflict with the interests of the large Russian population in these territories. This population included not only the Russian peasants but all the workers on railways and other communications, and also in the mines and factories.

The following passage,[1] written with special reference to 175
the then situation in Bashkiria, is of wider application. It 669
demonstrates what were the real motives impelling the Soviets 563
to act in a manner precisely contrary to the professions of their 1917 Declaration to the Muslim peoples of Russia.[1]

> Most Soviet organs in the Urals were predominantly Great Russian in their ethnic make-up because their personnel consisted largely of industrial workers, soldiers of the garrisons, and peasants, none of which existed among the Moslems in any sizeable numbers.

[1] [cat. 116 p105 - Analyst] Bib. II, 8, R. E. Pipes.

> ● 175 The Bashkirs . . . had no proletariat . . . only a small part of
> 669 them engaged in settled agricultural pursuits. Hence it is not
> surprising that the various Soviets were predominantly Russian
> 563 and came to fight for specifically Russian interests. That meant that local Soviet institutions took the side of Russian colonists in their struggle for land with the Bashkir peasantry. Bashkirs were in many cases prevented from joining local Soviets.

The writer goes on to quote the central Soviet delegate to Bashkiria as having admitted, perhaps ironically, that, despite their best intentions, the Bolsheviks at that time simply spearheaded the onslaught of the Russian Kulaks on Bashkurd lands. They incited the colonists against the indigenous peoples, armed them, and saw to it that only they should benefit from food distribution measures taken to combat the famine.

This state of affairs enabled the Kremlin to put any convenient gloss it wished on its announcements in favour of local autonomy, self-determination or even secession. Thus Stalin could later claim that the nationality policy was to be national in its outward form but proletarian in its inner substance,[1] and justify the exclusion of an indigenous population lacking a proletariat not only from participation in the organs of supreme revolutionary power but even from the management of its own local affairs. And this, in fact, is what he said and subsequently did. Adjustments were made from time to time to appease national leaders who seemed in the Kremlin to dispose of a temporary power deserving of some respect; but when all was prepared and the base secure, both the will and the force were made available to overthrow them. That is roughly what happened, first in Kokand, later in Bashkiria, and finally, when the time was ripe, in Khiva and Bukhara too. It is what happened in the Caucasus. Further, not only was Moscow, in common with the Whites, determined to uphold Russian colonial interests in Asia; both blocked and frustrated every effort by the Bashkurds, Kazaks and leaders of southern Turkistan to get together with a view to forming a unified State. Both Reds and Whites regarded 175 every such step as in the nature of a pan-Islamic or pan-Turkic 669 alliance to which they were extremely hostile. In the end the 563 autonomous local government of Bashkiria was destroyed by the infiltration of agents of the central Party who organized cells among the Russian population. The method adopted was to place in the hands of the local Party bosses the sole authority for the alleviation of the terrible starvation and disease which had followed the famine and was decimating the peoples of the area. The authority of the Bashrevcom was undermined until, with their army absent fighting the Whites and the Poles in the West, they began to lose even the semblance of a government.

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[1] Bib. I, 90, p. 210.

In May 1920 Moscow published a new decree to regulate the autonomy of Bashkiria. This withdrew most of the powers delegated a year before, subordinating all subjects of importance, political, financial and economic, to the Centre. The Bashkurd leaders decided on one final effort, and adopted a strongly worded protest of which the main interest is that it is the earliest realization by the victims that the Soviets were determined, in their own way and time, to work for a Russian hegemony over other peoples. At that time (1920) this reality had not appeared from behind the mask of fair-seeming Soviet platitude lauding such aims as 'Asia for the Asians' or 'Freedom for the Peoples of Islam' — aims which today would be dismissed as mere bourgeois-nationalism. But the Bashkurd leaders, even then, had seen behind the façade. They charged the Party in general, and Stalin in particular, with having embarked upon a course of out-and-out Great Russian chauvinism.

Togan went to Moscow in May 1920 to see what he could do. Stalin and Kamenev sent him a message to come and spend some time with the Bashkurd troops fighting the Poles on the Ukraine front, Stalin hinting that the difficulties were all due to Trotsky into whose mouth he put the opinion that the rise of Togan's influence on the Asiatic front was dangerous to Soviet Russia. Togan was loth to go, remarking that Stalin

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175 was only putting his own opinion into the mouth of Trotsky,
669 whom he disliked. Lenin, however, ordered him to comply,
563 and a few days later he met Stalin in the south. What follows
is best told in Togan's own words :[1]

> I met Stalin near the Crimea at Kremenchuk, where towards evening our carriages were hooked onto his private train. We had long conversations together both on a motor drive at Kremenchuk and in the train. He was very friendly, and it seemed as if his heart burned for the Eastern Turks, for us small nations. He threw all the blame on Trotsky, whom he described as one who cared nothing for nationalists. He himself, he said, was the son of a Georgian nationalist ; that was why he understood us so well. He abused the Russians for their chauvinism, but told me — as had Lenin a few days before — I ought to do my duty in the spirit of Great Russia and not worry so much about governing a small tribe. I was obliged to remind myself that this man, with whom I had talked for so long at table in the Tsar's ornate railway carriage, was in no wise to be trusted, and that, despite all his fair and partly reasonable words, no good was to be expected from him or from the Russian Communist Party which he even then controlled.

Togan was admitted also to more than one personal conversation with Lenin himself. A debate was proceeding in Moscow at the time regarding what was then still called the colonial question, and Lenin sent him the draft of a thesis on 'Nationalities and Colonial Problems', asking him to put down observations in writing on twelve theses which he — Lenin — had set forth. On one of these points Togan advised the despatch of a High Commission to Turkistan to be composed of three Russians and three Muslims — a conservative proportion, given the tone of the November Declaration. Lenin accepted this and made the Muslim appointments, only a little later to withdraw the names and substitute Russians, of whom Kuibishev was one. There could hardly have been a clearer departure from the spirit of the Declaration. Again, as so often with Communist papers, Lenin's draft proceeded on certain *ex cathedra* assumptions which set 'the proletariat' at the head of the pluses, and the 'small bourgeoisie' at the

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[1] *Op. cit.* p. 400.

bottom of the minuses as a class which had nothing to expect. 175
Togan demanded a clear definition of both phrases, enquiring 669
pertinently how far each term, as used, cut across nationalities. 563
Lenin found the question an awkward one, but advanced the thesis that 'the colonies' only trusted representatives of the Russian proletariat and this would be the case in future. National leaders in those regions would command trust only in so far as they remained faithful and obedient to the proletariat of the ruling nation. Lenin even advanced the personal opinion that, after the victory of the Social Revolution throughout the world, the Colonial nations in the East must be guided by the workers of the ruling nations of Europe, by which he meant Russia, France and England. During the process of socialization the workers of the native populations must be regarded as *in statu pupillari* only.

There remains one final account of a conversation between Lenin and Togan, which must be related in the latter's own words :[1]

> I have just [he writes] tuned in to Moscow radio, and the first sentence I heard was to the effect that loyalty in our time is a stupid quality. Twenty-one years ago, when a dispute between ourselves and Moscow was being discussed I wanted to gather information regarding a clause in the treaty between the two States. I had approached Lenin, who, without mincing words, said that a treaty was simply a piece of paper. When I said that in our country we were used to keeping promises according to the tradition of our ancestors, he replied, 'Then your ancestors must have been stupid. I took you for a revolutionary. Look at the real facts, not at a piece of paper.'

Even then the period had passed when Liberalism served as a vehicle for Communist propaganda, and a screen for Communist intentions. Lenin's words, spoken in 1917, are the more haunting :

> We want a voluntary union of nations — a union which would permit of no oppression of one nation by another — such a union as would be based on the most complete confidence,

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[1] From Togan's facsimile written in 1940.

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175 on a clear understanding of fraternal unity, on entirely voluntary
669 consent.

563 The Bashkurd leaders realized what had happened and dispersed to organize resistance elsewhere. In Bashkiria the rest of 1920 was passed in Civil War. Under cover of suppression of a counter-revolutionary rising there began a reign of terror, forcing the Bashkurds into the mountains, where they were killed off by Red troops raised from Russian colonists, or succumbed to the rigours of a severe winter. Removed from those events we can now see that what really happened was the stimulation by revolutionary passions of the national emotions of Russian and Turk alike, with the result that revolutionary action took the form of a national and not a class struggle. The contest between nomad and colonist was inevitably expressed as a clash between Turk and Russian. In this struggle the Turks were doomed to failure, not only because Russia as Russia was strong, but because these Turks were nomads and their social and economic structure gave them no part in Communist cells, composed of soldiers, peasants and industrial labourers.

Togan disappeared. One morning in July 1920, in the disguise of Red Army uniform and on pretext of going to Astrakhan on leave, he disappeared and made his way to Baku. From Baku he crossed the Caspian to the Turkmen country and succeeded in winning through to Bukhara. But before he reached safety he addressed a letter as a parting shot to Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky.[1]

> We see [he wrote] you accept the ideas of genuine national Russian chauvinism as the basis of your policy. Everything has turned out as the true Russians wished it. Frunze [the Red General, whose name was later given to Pishpek, the capital of Kirghizia] and Kuibishev, who head the Turkistan Commission, have said openly that at all its meetings a hypocritical policy has been pursued against the native Turkish Communists, and that cooperation with us has been a pure pretence. . . . Another member of this Commission said that class must be deliberately set against class among

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[1] *Op. cit.* p. 403.

the native population, by representing the nationalists to be the enemies of the working-class and due for extirpation. But you should realize we mean to give you no opportunity to make us out to be class enemies of the proletariat. You will find plenty to sacrifice, but we are not the men to offer ourselves blindly to sacrifice. The Comintern leaders, Zinoviev and Radek, have treated the representatives of the eastern nations like anti-revolutionary peasants . . . you choose to assume that the most essential problem in the east is the land question, and that the class war in the east rests on that question. You are about to revive the class-war by terrorist means. But we have clearly explained in our reply to the thesis written by Comrade Lenin on colonial problems that the land question in the east has in principle produced no class distinction [between us]. For in the east it is the European Russians, whether capitalists or workers, who are the top class, while the people of the soil [*yerli*], rich or poor, are their slaves. Why should there be any distinction of class between those who have the land cultivated and those who do the work? You will go on finding class enemies of the workers, and rooting them out until every educated man among the native population [*yerli*] has been removed and there are only left the peasants who know only about asses, oxen and spades.

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In other words, as he might have added, do you, Comrades Lenin and Stalin, till the land?

To grasp that these words were written to the Soviet leaders as early as 1920 is to realize that the Turks of Central Asia could throw up men of no usual penetration. And they were now to receive a new inspiration, combining the old and the new pattern of Turkish native endeavour.

VII

ENVER AND THE BASMACHIS

O, young Lochinvar is come out of the west . . .

000 IT is now time to turn from events in the north, which had worked themselves to a standstill in so far as the redemption of Central Asian freedom was concerned, and to examine what had been happening along the courses of the rivers and in the ancient States of Bukhara and Khiva. I have shown that very soon after the Revolution the Bolsheviks had captured and held the key to Turkistan at Tashkent, and from that centre had succeeded in crushing the short-lived Kokand government early in 1918. From that point we have followed a circle against the clock, starting from Kokand, proceeding over the Kazak steppe to its fringe in Bashkiria in the Urals, and thence by way of Moscow and the Crimea ● 175 to Baku. By the end of 1920, disillusioned but not despondent, Togan has left Baku and, travelling incognito to escape the attention of the Soviets whom he had defied, crossed the Caspian back into Turkistan to arrive in Bukhara in January 1921. Here he soon found himself dealing with the very tribal forces whose movement, touched off by the train lit at Kokand three years earlier, was due for a big explosion in a few months' time.

The difficulties of the Bolsheviks in the south of Turkistan had been greater than any they were called on to meet on the northern steppe, where they were contending only with disorganized Cossacks or the Whites under Kolchak. In the south these difficulties sprang partly from the internal political situation bequeathed to them by the continued existence of quasi-independent 'Native States', much of whose territory was either in the mountains or behind the desert (for Khiva had no railway). Partly they arose from the fact that Bukhara at least was a frontier territory bordering on Afghanistan, a country which their predecessors had acknowledged was beyond the sphere of Russian influence. The southern frontier with Afghanistan stood on that general line against which the Russian tide had washed and found itself unable to advance farther against British resistance organized in the defence of India. Both politically and geographically it had seemed that on this line a stable international balance had at last been attained. But the stability of a frontier depends on the continued existence of steady conditions on each side of it; disturbance on either side is likely to upset the balance.

The six months or so following the October Revolution in Russia were coincident in time with a most critical period of World War I. The weight of America had not had time to affect the issue, Russia had fallen in the race, and the possibility of a German victory could not yet be ruled out. Turkey, though hard hit in Irak and Syria, was still formidable. In 1918 the Turks under Nuri Pasha, half-brother of Enver, began a thrust forward to the Caucasus and succeeded in capturing Baku. A German mission under von Hentig and von Niedermeyer had been in Kabul in an endeavour to persuade the Afghan Emir Habibullah to denounce his undertakings to the British in India and in the name of Islam to raise the North-West Frontier in revolt.[1] Meanwhile in Turkistan all was turmoil and it remained uncertain in 1918 which side would prevail in the civil war then raging. Thousands of Austrian and Hungarian prisoners of war, interned in and around Tashkent and elsewhere, had been released and were at large. It is not surprising that Britain thought it necessary to look to the defences of India.

This it was always the British way to achieve by the use of the smallest possible force at the farthest accessible point on the glacis of the Indian fort, not waiting for the turmoil

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[1] This German effort failed to affect the outcome of the war, but it left its seed. In 1919 Habibullah was murdered, and there followed Amanullah's assault on India and the Afghan war — events as it happened beyond the present story. Had this pistol gone off a year earlier, events would have merged.

175 outside to spread to the buffer States along the marches and expose India's own frontiers to direct attack. And this, in accordance with a well-tried principle, is what was done in the present case, and carried through successfully.

The object of the government in India at that time was to prevent a German-Turkish thrust being launched from the Caucasus by way of northern Persia or Turkistan into Afghanistan and so against India. A serious invasion of this kind in 1918 would have tied down many troops in India and borne hardly on the conduct of the war in Europe and the Middle East. Consequently, a small force of less than brigade strength, under General Dunsterville and known later as Dunsterforce, was sent to Baku; and another even smaller force under General Malleson, known as the North Persian cordon, stood on guard at Meshed and pushed forward outposts in the direction of Merv in Turkistan. At about the same time a diplomatic mission was sent to Tashkent from India via Kashghar, where the government of India maintained a Consulate on behalf of His Majesty's government. This mission was under the direction of Colonel Bailey, of the Indian Political Department,[1] who was ordered to open negotiations with whatever authority should be found to be in power in Turkistan. The situation was kaleidoscopic and the future unguessed, but the main object was to induce any authority capable of implementing an agreement to neutralize the dangers which were expected to arise from the release of the Austro-Hungarian prisoners, and their possible junction with any Turkish or German force which might advance from the west.

Dunsterville succeeded in occupying Baku for a few days, but was driven out. His advance did, however, result in securing for the Royal Navy the vital command over the waters of the Caspian Sea which was needed to anticipate any attempt to extend the Turco-German thrust in the direction of India. And Malleson was in position in reserve on the

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[1] This service was not concerned with politics but was in effect the government's diplomatic corps. For an account see Bib. I, 18.

Meshed–Merv line as an outpost in the second line to deal with any advance attempted by the land-route through Persia or Turkistan. On reaching Merv he was attacked by Bolshevik forces, which he drove off. He then opened negotiations with a group of Mensheviks, who had succeeded in obtaining temporary control of Ashkabad and agreed that they would aid him in opposing any enemy advance from the west. (It has to be remembered that the Mensheviks were for continued prosecution of the war against Germany and Turkey, while the Bolsheviks had made peace.) This group, supported by Malleson, was for some time in control of the Trans-Caspian Railway, so blocking communications by that route to the Bolsheviks in Tashkent. It was during this time that these Mensheviks caught and murdered twenty-six Red Commissars trying to make their way through from Baku (which had again changed hands) to Tashkent — an incident which Soviet propaganda still bitterly attributes to British influence, unknowing that it is not our way to murder captives in cold blood, or if we can prevent it, permit others to do so.[1] Meanwhile Bailey, arriving with difficulty at Tashkent and having presented his credentials, was threatened with arrest and even with execution, and had to go to ground. After more than a year of hide-and-seek he managed to elude capture by the delightful ruse of going to the Bolsheviks in disguise and offering to pursue and catch himself. His offer was accepted and he chased himself with alacrity into Persia early in 1920 under a hail of bullets to the last. It is pleasant to believe that even the Soviets enjoyed the jest, for to save face they announced sadly a little later that Bailey had died, they were sorry, for they had never borne him any malice and had given him a military funeral. He lives to tell the tale.[2]

By this time World War I was safely over and British forces could be withdrawn from the glacis of India. But it has been necessary to digress in order to explain how it came about that British intervention in the south of Turkistan,

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[1] For details of this incident see Bib. I, 51, pp. 144-6, and II, 7, Malleson.

[2] Bib. I, 5.

2: Caroe S-4 (no date) 1953 RL1 Soviet Central Asia RL1

•175 essential as it was to meet a Turco-German threat to India while the issue of the War was as yet uncertain, placed the Tashkent Soviets in peril and might have lost them Turkistan. The British action was never intended to do more than achieve the limited object of preventing the use of Turkistan with its communications as a springboard for attack on India, but in carrying this out it inevitably made more difficult the execution of Soviet general policy in the same quarter. On a narrower stage also it probably delayed the assumption by the Soviets of effective control over the Khiva and Bukhara States.

668 It was not until September 1920 that the last Mangit Emir, Abdul Said Mir Alim, found himself unable to maintain his position in Bukhara and gave way to a national reformist group which, after the manner of the Young Turks of Istanbul, called itself a Young Bukhara Party. The chairman of the Party was a young Bukharan named Osman Khoja, who later distinguished himself with Enver's successor, Haji Sami, and helped to maintain relations between the Basmachis and their sympathizers in Afghanistan. The *coup d'état* was achieved with the aid of Soviet troops which plundered the ancient city, destroying many of the *medreses* and setting fire to the famous library containing at that time possibly the most valuable collection of Muslim manuscripts in the world. The Emir fled to the mountains in the eastern part of his State (now Tajikistan), where he established a base at Dushembe (now Stalinabad). He maintained himself there among the Basmachis until March 1921, when he withdrew to Afghanistan. The same period saw the end of an independent Khiva, where a Young Khiva Party seized the person of the Khan, handed him over to the Russians and began to rule themselves.

Although these parties of young revolutionaries were at the outset far to the Left in their political views and were under the closest Soviet control, Bukhara and Khiva were not at first required to call themselves Socialist Soviet republics. The Kremlin was content to know them as Peoples' Soviet republics and to leave them to be governed nominally by the 'young' parties who had seized power, with a Russian political reprep.12

312 time one of the most flourishing towns of the Orient, and many other similar settlements have thus become deserted ruins, covered with thorny bushes and saksaul (salt 245 shrubs). The irrigated districts on the contrary are exceedingly fertile; they produce cotton and fruit rather than grain. Apricots grow in such abundance that only a small portion of the harvest can be eaten or dried for the winter; pomegranates, figs, and grapes are to be had in large quantities. No country produces more or better varieties of peaches, and melons are grown even in districts which are 484 practically deserts. Traffic by caravan (see ill. page 1434) has reached a very high standard of development.

[361] The municipal civilization which has grown up in these oases is of great antiquity, as is 175 shown by the Zend Avesta, the sacred book of the ancient Persians. Merv and other important towns have perished in the course of the centuries, others, like Samarkand, continue to flourish to this day. The libraries and theo-

532 *Timur (Tamerlane, 1370–1405) in front of his tent surrounded by courtiers. Miniature in one of the oldest illustrated biographies of Tamerlane. 1467. Privately owned, Brooklyn.*



1 [p.3-- Analyst]

175 logical schools of Turkestan in its early Islamic period were famous throughout Asia. The physician Ibn Sina (980–1037), better known under the name of Avicenna, worked at Bokhara, and the famous geographer Jakut (1179–1229) took three years to exploit the works of the ten great libraries of Merv for his geographical studies. Early descriptions of the bazaars of Samarkand, such as that given

14

● 175 by Gonzales del Clavijo, who in 1403 travelled to the court of Timur (1370–1405) as an ambassador of Spain, confirmed the fact that it was a centre of international commerce, where the goods of all the countries of Asia, even those of the remotest, were to be found. Silks of Turkestan and horses from Ferghana were important articles of export, and reports on the arts at the court of the Indian Mogul em-

15

175 perors speak of paper from Samarkand as the
best in the world for artistic purposes and for
calligraphy. The blue-glazed domes and mos-
361 ques of Samarkand with their glittering
fayence tiles (see ill. adjoining)[1] are unsur-
passed anywhere in the world. To this day the
town has remained an important centre of cul-
ture. In modern times Andishan, Khokand, and
Khojent, as centres of the cotton-trade (see
ill. page 1438)[2] became not only wealthy towns,
but places of extravagant luxury in the Euro-
pean sense of the word. Bokhara, the object of
many wars in the course of its history, was
from the middle of the eighteenth century on-
ward the residence of the Emirs of Bokhara;
Tashkent and Askhabad were the seats of the
Russian administration, in these towns the
Russian quarters surpassed the Mohammedan
[439] 437 in size and importance. At the present time
the country's commerce with India and China
is practically at a standstill, so that prosperity
[177] has greatly declined. Though Western civili-
zation has made progress, modernization has
not come up to expectations, a fact scarcely
surprising in view of the extreme conservatism
prevailing among the Islamic population of
Central Asia.

184
619 The checkered history of Turkestan led to
the development of a great number of different
tribes that are found both in town and country
and whose manifold ethnological differences

[1] [See cat 116, p 18--Analyst]

[2] [See cat 116, p 18--Analyst]



The dome of the Mosque of Shir Dar in Samarkand. Built in 1616.

184 find expression in habits and customs, dress
619 and textiles. This is particularly the case where Western Turkestan is concerned (see ill. page
175 1451)[3] The richness of the country attracted many invaders, all of whom have left their mark on the country and its population. In an-

[3] [See cat. 116, p. 52--Analyst]

346

Tamerlane's tomb at Samarkand.

175 cient times it was the northermost part of Persia, closely united to that country by ties of religion and culture. Its inhabitants, even those of the extreme northern districts in the neighbourhood of the Aral Sea are frequently depicted on sculptures of the tombs of Persian kings, and are seen among the tribute bearers on the friezes of Persepolis (see ill. page 1439). * They are shown wearing caps that cover the entire head with the exception of the face; these caps are not unlike those worn by some Kirghiz tribes as a protection against sand and snow-storms. The figures depicted as subjects of Persia may have belonged to a nation which spoke one of the Indo-Germanic languages, and it is assumed that Turkestan was originally peopled by one of the many Indo-Germanic races. However that may be, large-scale migrations of tribes, the effects of which were felt throughout Asia and sometimes even in Europe, swept over the country, and changed the character of the population. In 329 B.C. Alexander the Great conquered Turkestan,

*[see cat. 116, p. 19 --Analyst]

175 and for a time took up residence at Samarkand. At a later period it became the subject of conflict between Persia and the Chinese. The ethnological fate of Turkestan was, however, finally decided by the Turks. It formed the Western part of the Great Empire which the Turks founded in the centre of Asia in the sixth century, and in the following period other Turkish tribes pressed after those who [162] had preceded them. To this day they form the major portion of the population of Eastern and Western Turkestan beside which the other components are comparatively insignificant. Even the conquest of the country by Islam, so decisive an event in the history of the peoples of other countries, such as North Africa, Sicily, and Spain, was in Turkestan of almost exclusively religious significance. Turkish predominance in Central Asia was in no way shaken by this new movement, the originators and pioneers of which were Arabs. On the contrary it was the Turks who after their conversion assumed the leadership in the Islamic world of Asia. They founded powerful dynasties in Afghanistan, India, and even in Egypt; Turkestan itself, geographically the extreme outpost of 361 the Mohammedan world, was in political respects 175 very often its centre. That was particularly the case under Timur (Tamerlane) (see ill. page 1437)[1] who brought artists and craftsmen from all his conquering raids to Samarkand, which he made a city of marvels, far surpassing in its magnificence any other town within the world of Islam (see ill. on this page);[2] Its superb buildings are entirely covered with coloured glaze that reflects the brilliant sun, producing an effect of beauty which would almost seem beyond anything in the nature of mere brick and stone. The tradition of this art outlived Timur's feeble successors; later Turkestan rulers like the Emirs of Bokhara continued to support the arts, though their standard had by then perceptibly declined. In ethnographic respects too, the inhabitants have changed but little, and the country has remained the centre of the Turkish world in Inner Asia.

[1] [See p. 12--Analyst]

[2] [See cat. 116, p. 20--Analyst]

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

MUSLIMS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

Richard Pipes

Part II

ETHNIC IDENTITY OF CENTRAL ASIAN MUSLIMS

UNTIL THE BEGINNING of the 20th century, Central Asia preserved its ethnic homogeneity remarkably well. 162 The tsarist government discouraged the migration of Slavs into the steppe region for 175 ● fear of native rebellions, while Turkestan, which in the centuries prior to Russian conquest had been one of the world's most isolated areas, virtually closed to non-Muslims, absorbed only a small trickle of Russian officials and merchants. Khiva and Bukhara continued even after the establishment of the Russian protectorate to admit only a small number of Russians. At the turn of the century Muslims formed over 90 percent of the total population of all Central Asia; in Turkestan itself they accounted for 97 percent of all the inhabitants.[a] (See Table I.)

Perhaps the most significant single change which has occurred in Central 167 Asia during the last half century has been the destruction of its ethnic homogeneity, brought about by Russian and Ukrainian immigration.

The first great migratory wave of Russians entered between 1906 and 1911, during the ministry of P. Stolypin, as a result of the deliberate effort of the tsarist regime to reduce the land hunger of the Russian villages by

Table I: RUSSIAN AND NATIVE POPULATION OF CENTRAL ASIA 162

(Including estimates for Khiva and Bukhara; in round figures)

	1897	*1911*	*1926*	*1939*
Muslims	9,300,000	10,400,000	10,700,000	c. 11,700,000
Russians	700,000	2,000,000	2,700,000	c. 4,500,000
Others	300,000	600,000	300,000	c. 400,000
Total	10,300,000	13,000,000	13,700,000	16,600,000

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[a] These statistics, and those which follow are based mainly on three sources: *Aziatskaia Rossiia*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1914); *Ts. St. Upr. SSSR. Narodnost' i rodnoi iazyk naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow, 1928); and *Strany mira* (Moscow, 1946). 127

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517 177 186 tellectuals communicate with each other in the local Turki dialects, not in Russian; they retain the customs, traditions, and other cultural traits previously discussed; they marry Muslims. They also retain a sense of loyalty to their people, a loyalty which is sufficiently strong to be seemingly unaffected by the close ties between the intellectuals and the regime. It is noteworthy that the majority of the refugees, though outspokenly anti-Communist in their sentiments, agreed that there is little friction between Muslim Communists and the rest of the Muslim population. The population does not transfer its dislike of the regime to its individual Muslim representatives, nor does it seem to regard Muslim Communists as apostates. On the contrary, Muslim Party members are regarded rather as friends and protectors, capable of shielding the inhabitants from the full brunt of Soviet policies. Many refugees recalled instances of receiving special consideration from Muslim Communists. The population is inclined to regard Muslims connected with the Communist machine as unwitting instruments of an evil system and to judge them entirely on their individual merits. Conversely, interrogation of Muslim refugees who had at one time belonged to the Communist Party indicates that in their minds they have not changed their national status by virtue of their Party allegiance. The notion of an all-embracing "Soviet" patriotism, fostered by the regime in its borderlands, apparently has had little if any success among the intellectuals.

This combination of Westernism and ethnic loyalty leads to the development of a sense of national consciousness on the part of the intelligentsia. However, because of Soviet cultural measures in the borderlands, this feeling appears to be as yet rather formless, inchoate, and devoid of a well formulated ideology.

517 ●175 177 For one thing, the Muslim intelligentsia is woefully ignorant of the history of Turkestan. This is hardly surprising, since the first histories of that area were published only after World War II (if one excepts the very scholarly and inaccessible monographs of Bartold and a few other scholars). The Soviet government deliberately minimizes the history of the Central Asian Turks and exaggerates the role of the Russian conqueror in order to undermine local nationalism and facilitate Russification. But the effect of these measures appears to be quite the opposite of what the Communists intend. Objectively speaking, the history of Turkestan is largely the story of the gradual conquest and destruction of a great Iranian civilization by barbarian Turkic nomads, resulting in perpetual internecine wars, isolation from the rest of the world, and cultural petrification of that area. In other words, the history of the Central Asian Turks is by no means a glorious one, either politically or culturally. By suppressing the study of native history, the regime actually helps stimulate the imagination of the native population. Ignorant of the facts, the natives glorify their past and create a mental picture of greatness which is quite unwarranted

by the historical record. Several of the more educated refugees presented 517
a completely distorted conception of Central Asian history; it was so
idealized as to be a model for the stimulation of nationalist emotions. 175•

The refugees also know very little about Central Asian history of recent 177
times. The jadidist movement, the All-Russian Muslim movement, the
events of the Revolution and civil war, the Kokand and Alash-Orda governments, are meaningless names to most of them. Most of the younger refugees knew of these events from the Soviet trials of the 1930's; none of them
knew what these parties really stood for. *Basmachestvo* [14] was somewhat 668
better known, because of its resurgence during the period of collectivization. Almost all of the refugees from Central Asia had had some personal experiences with the Basmachis, and could discuss the activities of these rebels in their region, though also tending to exaggerate their feats.

CONCLUSIONS

Speaking broadly, Soviet Central Asia may be said to have undergone
in the course of the past fifty years two parallel developments: the native 177
population has been transformed from a loose agglomeration of diverse 668
tribes and ill-defined ethnic groups into several distinct nationalities, and the Russians residing in Central Asia have grown from an insignificant minority to an important segment of the total population. Both these developments are intimately connected; both may be expected to continue in the foreseeable future.

The first of these two processes has been by and large encouraged by the Soviet authorities because of their fear of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanianism. Faced with the choice of a movement aspiring to integrate all the Central Asian natives into a single nationality bound by the ties of a common religion or racial descent, and the formation of several separate nationalities, they selected the latter alternative as less dangerous to their political hold on the area. This course, however, had its price, for it compelled the Communists to encourage the growth of national consciousness among the major native ethnic groups.

But it would be a mistake to seek in Soviet strategy the *cause* of this process of nationality formation. The cause lies far deeper. The growth of nationalism in Central Asia, as in other parts of the world recently affected by European ideas, institutions, and technology, must above all be ascribed to the fact that the encounter of Westernism and tradition rarely results in a clear-cut victory for either force, but rather leads to a synthesis of both. *Nationalism represents such a synthesis of imported Western and traditional native values.* It owes its success to the fact that it permits the adoption of all the essential features of European civilization

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[14] *Basmachestvo* was a native resistance movement directed against the Soviet regime; it was
particularly active in the period 1918–1922. See Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pp. 178–80, 255–60. 668

21; Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL]

IX

SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

The possession of wide stretches of Central Asia is one of the essential S.U.
factors which have made Russia a world power. The area east of the 636
Caspian Sea and south of the lakes Aral and Balkash has, from the point 648
of view of Russian power politics, far greater weight than the whole 185
gigantic body of Siberia. This area is indeed the watchtower from which Russia can look into India, Western China and Afghanistan. With Central Asia as far as the Pamir in her hands, Russia has become an Asiatic power without losing her separate status as a European power, while the possession of the much larger but more isolated Siberia had made Russia only a Euro-Asiatic power.

Ethnically Central Asia is not the natural continuation of European T.
Russia like Western Siberia. Central Asia, which is primarily inhabited 101
by Asiatic peoples with an old history and an old civilization, is a colony of the Russian Empire where Russian colonization has been and still is active and successful.

THE CONQUEST

The Russian advance into Central Asia was carried out mainly in the S.U
nineteenth century, mostly during its latter half, although the founda- 175
tions for the final conquest were laid and consolidated from the [636]
eighteenth century onwards. 185

Russia established her rule over Central Asia by a gigantic two- T.
pronged strategic movement starting from Omsk in a southerly 175
direction and from Orenburg in a south-easterly direction.

The main work had been performed from Orenburg, later named after S.U. [361]
Chkalov, the first Soviet pilot to fly from Russia to America across the North Pole. The foundation of Orenburg, which is no more than a provincial town on the border of Europe and Asia, was one of the most outstanding events in Russian history, ranking in importance not far behind the conquest of Kazan. Unlike the establishment of many other outposts of the Russian Empire, the beginnings of Orenburg did not result from Cossack exploits, but from careful geographical and political
planning]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1.Soviet Union R1

Turkestan RL1

S.U. planning. Some of the finest Russian brains of the epoch, such as I. K. 175 Kirillov, the author of the first geographical atlas of the Russian Empire, 185 and the prominent historian V. N. Tatishchev, were associated with the T Orenburg project. It is characteristic of the methods of Russian coloniza- 175 tion that Orenburg was actually founded three times. In 1737 the original Orenburg fortress was erected at the confluence of the rivers Or and Ural; in 1740 it was transplanted about 112 miles down the river, and S.U. in 1742 it was shifted to a place about 165 miles from Orenburg II. [103] The very name of Orenburg was no longer justified since the fortress was, in its final location, far away from the Or river.

For a hundred years the Russians stopped at Orenburg. They used it as a cornerstone for the building of the Orenburg Line, a chain of small fortresses along the Ural river, but for a long time they did not move further. A similar chain of fortresses called the Irtysh Line was built at the north-eastern fringe of Central Asia, south of Omsk. Around the middle of the nineteenth century, the Russians started to move again. They advanced from Orenburg to the Lake Aral and reached the mouth of the Syr Darya river in 1847. Starting from the Irtysh Line they pushed forward to the Lake Balkash and beyond. In 1853, troops of the military governor of Orenburg gained command of the middle course of the Syr Darya by capturing Ak Mechet, which then became the Fort Perovsk, while in the next year troops advancing from the Irtysh Line erected the fortress of Verny – 'The Faithful'.

The most triumphant day of the whole Central Asiatic campaign was June 15th, 1865, when General M. G. Chernayev, with only 1,500 men and twelve cannons, captured Tashkent against enemy forces 30,000 men strong and having fifty guns at their disposal. Only two persons were killed in the final 'assault' on the city, which became the administrative centre of Russian Central Asia.

Three years later another Russian force took, likewise almost without casualties, the town of Samarkand, once one of the most splendid cities of the world, for the possession of which Asiatic rulers had sacrificed tens of thousands of people. A great act of historic *revanche* was associated with this victory. In Samarkand was the grave of Timur the Lame, before whom Russia had trembled and whose men had set Moscow on fire.

From the point of view of Soviet Russian state ideology it is of no small importance that the most vital parts of Central Asia and, in particular, some large and famous towns joined Russia's fold, not as a result of bloody battles, but by virtue of the respect inspired by Russian might and superiority, and as the outcome of skilled manœuvring and diplomatic action. When the Soviet régime reconquered Central Asia for Russia from local nationalists during the Civil War, it was at a much higher cost in human life.